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Many of today’s corporations face crisis events. A few well-known examples 
include Tylenol’s poisoned capsules, Odwalla’s contaminated juice, Mattel’s defective 
toys, Toyota’s product-recalls, and more recently, BP’s Gulf oil spill. Whether or not it is 
at fault, a corporation must sometimes overcome negative public sentiment resulting from 
a crisis and taking a proper action, especially an appropriate response strategy, is 
necessary for the company to overcome such a predicament.   
This study, therefore, seeks to systematically investigate how two critical 
constructs – consumer-company identification and corporate association-crisis type 
congruence – in a corporate crisis context conjointly determine the effectiveness of crisis 
communication strategies by the corporation. More specifically, this study examines how 
varying degrees of consumer identification with a company affect the effectiveness of 
one of the common crisis response strategies, excuse. It also seeks to discover how the 
consumer-company identification moderates the effectiveness of different types of crisis 
vii 
communication strategies (compensation vs. apology). In addition, the study attempts to 
determine how perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type moderates the 
effects of crisis communication strategies (excuse vs. apology).  
The study’s results show that the excuse strategy is more effective for consumers 
strongly identified with a company than for those weakly identified with it. However, the 
level of consumer-company identification is not found to moderate the effectiveness of 
the compensation and apology strategies. The study also found a significant moderating 
role of perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type in determining the 
effectiveness of the excuse and apology strategies. The findings suggest that when a 
company faces a crisis that violates its core corporate associations, the apology strategy is 
more effective; a company involved in a crisis irrelevant to its corporate associations is 
better served by the excuse strategy. 
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CHAPTER I:  INTRODUCTION 
Many of today’s corporations face crisis events. A crisis is, by definition, an 
unexpected and unwanted event that seriously threatens an organization’s major goals 
(Hermann, 1972), viability (Pearson & Clair, 1998), or social legitimacy (Cowden & 
Sellnow, 2002). A few well-known episodes of a corporate crisis include Tylenol’s 
poisoned capsules, Odwalla’s contaminated juice, Mattel’s defective toys, Toyota’s 
product-recalls, and more recently, BP’s Gulf oil spill. Whether or not it is at fault, a 
corporation must sometimes overcome negative public sentiment resulting from such a 
crisis. In damaging a quality relationship between a corporation and the public (Coombs 
& Holladay, 2001), a crisis can cause the corporation severe financial and reputational 
setbacks (Mitroff, Pauchant, & Shrivastava, 1998). The aforementioned examples indeed 
showed that how a corporate crisis could quickly mar the company’s once sterling image. 
Some of these corporations (e.g., Tylenol, Odwalla Foods, Mattel), however, by 
successfully managing the crisis, transformed it into an opportunity. Poor crisis 
management by others (e.g., Toyota, BP), on the other hand, only aggravated the 
predicament. 
Thus, proper crisis management, and crisis communication in particular, is critical 
to a corporation’s pulling through a crisis and to its general long-term success. Crisis 
communication literature suggests that crisis management can minimize reputational 
threats in a crisis by selecting, for each particular crisis situation, the most effective and 
appropriate crisis response strategy. According to Image Restoration Theory, if a 
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corporation takes an appropriate action in a crisis situation, it can alter the public’s 
negative perception, restoring its reputation/image (Benoit 1997). Similarly, based on 
Impression Management Theory, Garrett, Bradford, Meyers, and Becker (1989) argued 
that an organization may influence individuals’ perceptions of a negative action by 
elaborating on why it acted as it did. They also asserted that selecting an appropriate 
communicative response best suited to the situational characteristic of the negative event 
is far more important than simply offering just any communicative response.  
This stream of context-oriented studies was developed based on Coombs’s 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT). SCCT provides a theoretical link 
between strategies of crisis communication and crisis situations. Earlier research on crisis 
communication simply listed various crisis response strategies and highlighted the 
selection of appropriate response strategies according to situational characteristics 
without much guidance (e.g., Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Garrett et al., 1989). In contrast, 
SCCT fleshes out the relations between the two constructs - crisis communication 
strategies and crisis situations – by introducing the concept of crisis responsibility 
(Coombs, 2007a). Additionally, this line of theoretical thinking demonstrates how 
situational factors influence the effectiveness of crisis response strategies that 
consequently affect organizational reputation and behavioral intention (Coombs, 
2007b).The primary focus of SCCT research has been, thus, to help a company choose 
the best crisis response strategy for a particular crisis situation and to provide a catalog of 
corporate response strategies, from defensive to accommodative, that may be suited to 
strategically address different crisis events (Coombs, 2007a).  
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Some key studies have explored situational factors that, when dealing with a 
corporate crisis, should be taken into account. Situational factors affecting crisis-related 
consumer behavior during a corporate crisis found from the research include the 
following: media-related factors - news frames (Cho & Gower, 2006; Kim & Cameron, 
2011), corporation-related factors - corporate reputation (Mowen, 1979; Mowen, Jolly, & 
Nickell,1981; Siomkos & Kurzbard, 1994), crisis-related factors—the perceived severity 
of a crisis (Robbennolt, 2000), and consumer-related factors—gender and cultural 
difference (Lauger & Coombs, 2006). The literature also identifies other factors that 
moderate the effectiveness of a crisis response strategy: crisis type (Dutta & Pullig, 
2011), crisis severity and organizational responsibility (Kim, 2002), the timing of crisis 
disclosure (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2011), the channel of a crisis response message 
(Coombs & Holladay 2009), locus of control (Claeys, Cauberghe, & Vyncke, 2010), and 
consumers’ prior expectations (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000), and others.  
Taken together, previous context-oriented crisis communication studies reflect 
one trend: in a crisis event, individual and environmental characteristics (i.e., media-
related, crisis-related, corporation-related, or crisis response-related) are seen as variables 
that determine attributions of responsibility. However, this line of research is rather 
disjointed and overlooks the comprehensive picture that should entail relationships 
among those variables of interest. That is, the research findings have shown the impact of 
each of the situational factors on the effectiveness of crisis communication strategies 
individually. Little effort, however, has been made to study how those situational 
variables (i.e., a crisis, a corporation, a consumer) are related to each other and jointly 
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determine consumer responses to a corporation’s crisis communication strategies. Thus, 
this dissertation research attempts to investigate how two critical constructs – consumer-
company identification, corporate association-crisis type congruence – in a corporate 
crisis context conjointly determine the effectiveness of crisis communication strategies by 
the corporation.  
In this regard, what follows are three justifications for taking a closer look at 
consumer-company identification and corporate association-crisis type congruence as 
being the key situational factors that influence the effectiveness of different types of 
crisis communicative strategies. First, although consumer-company identification and 
corporate associations are central concepts in the areas of corporate management and 
marketing, researchers have made little effort to understand their roles in corporate crisis 
contexts. Second, as suggested by contingency theory (Zhang, Qiu, & Cameron, 2004), 
an organization’s PR strategies are influenced by characteristics unique to the 
organization and as well as to the involved constituents or public. Nevertheless, the 
literature on crisis communication strategy effectiveness focuses mainly on the effects of 
crisis-related factors (e.g., crisis type, crisis severity) while relatively neglecting 
consumer-related (e.g., consumer-company identification) and company-related factors 
(e.g., corporate associations). Third, previous research has, as noted earlier, examined a 
single component/variable as a key crisis situational factor in isolation. However, the 
present study explores the effectiveness of crisis communication strategies as a function 
of  relationships among multiple components (e.g., consumer and company, company 
and crisis). It seems advisable to apply relevant and useful concepts (i.e., consumer-
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company identification, corporate associations-crisis type congruence, etc.) to the 
fragmented and understudied crisis communication literature. Such an effort should fill in 
the gap in the current literature and yield implications that are both theoretical and 
pragmatic.  
Therefore, the first goal of the present dissertation research is to examine how 
varying degrees of consumer identification with a company moderate the effectiveness of 
different types of crisis communication strategies (excuse vs. compensation vs. apology). 
To achieve this goal, an experiment is designed to discover whether the excuse strategy is 
more effective for consumers who are strongly identified with a company than for those 
who weakly identified with it. The compensation strategy is as effective as the apology 
strategy for consumers with high consumer-company identification. The first 
experimental study also seeks to examine whether the apology strategy is more effective 
than the compensation strategy for those with low consumer-company identification. 
Another goal of this study is to investigate how perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type affects the effectiveness of different types of crisis 
communication strategies (excuse vs. apology). To this end, another experiment will 
examine whether the apology strategy is more effective when company associations are 
congruent with a crisis type than when incongruent. The second experimental study also 
seeks to discover whether the excuse strategy is more effective when company 
associations are incongruent with a crisis type than when congruent. 
The potential contribution of this dissertation research is both theoretical and 
practical. On the theory side, findings of this study contribute not only to the stream of 
6 
context-oriented crisis communication research but also to the literature pertaining to 
corporate identification and associations. In addition, this study helps explain the 
underlying mechanism of the effectiveness of corporate crisis communication strategies. 
It does this by drawing on various theoretical perspectives, including motivated reasoning 
theory from psychology, forgiveness theory from interpersonal communication, 
identification effects in celebrity endorsement literature, and, from retailing literature, the 
concept of feeling betrayed.  
On the practical front, this research is informative to crisis managers. Findings of 
this research help them gain insight into how to best choose the most appropriate and 
effective response strategy when a crisis arises. The results of this research are especially 
useful regarding segmentation and targeting of crisis communication and help devise 
strategies depending upon target audiences’ characteristics. Additionally, the findings  
hint at the importance of corporate associations/image management in non-crisis/routine 
situations as well as additional criteria to consider in selecting the best response strategy. 
Finally, findings in this area help provide crisis managers with cost-effective crisis 
communication efforts.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a 
comprehensive review of the related literature. Chapter III sets forth the hypotheses that 
are examined in this dissertation research. Chapter IV entails the method, the results, and 
the discussion of findings regarding Study 1. In the same order, details of Study 2 are 
presented in Chapter V. Lastly, Chapter VI concludes this dissertation with discussion of 
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the implications and limitations of the present study as well as directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER II:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter covers two things. First, it reviews how crisis communication 
literature studies crisis communication strategies. Second, it examines how to 
theoretically apply to the corporate crisis context the two constructs of consumer-
company identification and corporate associations-crisis type congruence. The first 
section will briefly address the definitions and effects of an organizational crisis. The 
second section will thoroughly review the literature regarding three major theories: Image 
Restoration Theory, Impression Management Theory, and Situational Crisis 
Communication. In line with the discussion of three primary theories, this section will 
review the research findings of previous studies on context-oriented crisis communication 
strategies. In particular, it examines past research on factors that moderate the effects of 
crisis communication strategies. The final section of this literature review will focus on 
corporate identity, consumer-company identification, and corporate associations. 
Specifically, it explains how consumer responses toward a crisis and a company are 
affected by the following: varying levels of consumer-company identification, and 
perceived fit between corporate associations and the type of crisis.   
Organizational Crisis and Effects 
A crisis is, by definition, an unexpected and unwanted event that seriously 
threatens an organization’s major goals (Hermann, 1972). According to Seeger, Sellnow, 
and Ulmer (1998), an organizational crisis is “a specific, unexpected, and non-routine 
event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and threaten or are 
perceived to threaten an organization’s high-priority goals” (p. 233). Similarly, Pearson 
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and Clair (1998) state that a crisis threatens “the viability of an organization and is 
characterized by ambiguity of cause, effect, and means of resolution” (p. 60). Crises also 
“threaten to dissolve an organizations’ social legitimacy” (Cowden & Sellnow, 2002, p. 
195) and can damage a quality relationship between an organization and its public 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2001). Finally, crises can cause severe financial and reputational 
setbacks (Mitroff, Pauchant, & Shrivastava, 1998). 
The literature of brand crisis suggests that brand misconduct, which is referred to 
as product and service-related defects as well as socially or ethically debatable actions 
(Huber, Vogel, & Meyer,2009), is accompanied by negative consequences on brand 
image and reputation (Klein, Smith, & John, 2004), brand equity (Dawar & Pillutla, 
2000), and marketing effectiveness (Van Heerde, Helsen, & Dekimpe,2007). Similarly, 
previous studies on product-harm crises also show that product-harm crises imperil long-
standing favorable consumer impressions about the company/product. They cause a great 
deal of the lost market capitalization through not only product recalls but also the 
intangibles—damage to corporate/brand reputation and consumers’ perceptions of and 
attitudes toward the company/brand (Klein & Dawar, 2004). 
Crisis Communication Strategies 
As described above, the effects of corporate crises are various but serious for both 
the short- and long-term survival of a corporation. Hence, corporations should 
proactively plan and formulate strategies to prevent potential crises or to at least 
minimize losses after crises occur (Ritchie, 2004). One of the critical factors that 
determine an organization’s viability, in a crisis situation, is consistent communication. 
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At the receiving end of crisis communication are not only consumers but stockholders, 
employees, suppliers, creditors, competitors, government agencies, and others (Cowden 
& Sellnow, 2002). To successfully negotiate the rough waters of a corporate crisis, a 
company must be strategic and consistent in how it communicates with all parties 
involved. Another critical point brought up in the crisis management literature is that a 
corporation should determine what exactly the crisis is before it responds. To best 
minimize negative outcomes, a company should then select the most appropriate crisis 
response strategy. Crisis communication strategies are supported by a large body of 
research that utilizes various theoretical perspectives. The following section discusses the 
major theories employed in the research stream of crisis communication strategies. 
Image Restoration Theory  
Benoit’s (1995) image restoration theory is, by and large, based on rhetoric’s 
theory of apologia: one’s actions or efforts (e.g., apologia) after an offensive act may 
restore one’s collapsed image. Dionisopoulos and Vibbert (1988) first applied to the 
context of corporate crisis communication the self-defense rhetorical strategies. In a 
similar fashion, Benoit (1995) employed the rhetorical concept of apologia in corporate 
crisis contexts and argued that corporate actions/efforts after a crisis could rebuild a 
tarnished corporate reputation/image. Basically, the image restoration theory is based on 
the following assumptions. First, perceptions are more important than reality. For 
example, even if a company is not, in fact, responsible for an offensive act, if the public 
believes it is, then the company’s reputation/image may be negatively affected. Second, a 
corporation’s appropriate actions/efforts may change the negative perception of the 
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company and consequently restore its reputation/image (Benoit, 1997). It should be noted 
that the key point to image restoration theory is that a corporation’s appropriate actions 
refer to image restoration strategies suited for a specific crisis situation. Image restoration 
theory, thus, focuses on message options suggesting five communication strategies, some 
of which encompass sub-dimensions (refer to Appendix A in detail): denial, evasion of 
responsibility, reducing offensiveness of event, corrective action, and mortification 
(Benoit, 1997).  
Early studies in the crisis communication domain that use image restoration 
theory are mostly case studies: USAir’s image repair discourse (Benoit & Czerwinski, 
1997), Tylenol’s poisoned image repair (Benoit & Lindsey, 1987), and Texaco’s 
damaged public image repair (Brinson & Benoit, 1999) are some of the examples. Such a 
case study approach is definitely useful and could provide guidance to crisis managers, 
especially those confronting a similar type of crisis. Some researchers, however, found 
this retrospective and descriptive approach insufficient to support the theoretical 
capability of image restoration theory. Hence, they started giving their attention to 
evidence-based crisis communication by empirically testing various types of response 
strategies in a particular crisis context (Coombs, 2007).  
Dean (2004), for instance, examined the effect of corporate response strategies 
(appropriate message vs. inappropriate message) on consumer evaluations of the 
company in the context of a food recall crisis. The results of the study showed that an 
appropriate message led to more positive evaluations than an inappropriate message. The 
former would include elements of corrective action and reducing offensiveness 
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(compensation). The latter would contain elements of denial (blame shift) and reducing 
offensiveness (bolstering). This finding is, of course, consistent with traditional wisdom: 
the more accommodative strategy, the more effective. Dardis and Haigh (2009), however, 
found that such common sense occasionally fails to hold true. They examined how each 
of Benoit’s five image restoration strategies –denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing 
offensiveness of event, corrective action, and mortification– affected consumers’ 
attitudes toward a company, the perceived corporate reputation, perceived corporate 
credibility, and perceived corporate positioning during a product-harm crisis situation. 
The study results demonstrated that, of the five strategies, reducing offensiveness was the 
most effective strategy regarding reputation-related perceptions of a company. Moreover, 
no difference manifested itself among the remaining four image restoration strategies. 
This finding supports the fact that accommodative strategies (e.g., apology, 
compensation, etc.) do not always guarantee success. In certain crisis situations, less 
accommodative strategies (e.g., reducing offensiveness of event) may be more effective 
than dramatically accommodative strategies. This implies that in crisis communication 
strategy studies, researchers should take into account crisis situations/contexts. Along 
these lines, one theory that supports the employment of communicative response 
strategies according to crisis situations is impression management research.  
Impression Management Theory 
Impression management theory is consistent with image restoration theory in so 
far as communication can be strategically used to repair a public impression/image. 
Impression management theory is largely based on attribution theory. More particularly, 
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classical attribution theory assumes that people search for information to determine the 
cause of a given action (Weiner, 1986). Impression management theory argues that 
people determine the cause of an observed action and hold perceptions of the actor or 
action based on information only accessible to them (Schlenker, 1980). This implies that 
people may be prone to error in determining the cause of an action and consequently 
form their perceptions of a given action from missing information. Impression 
management theory assumes two things: fundamental attribution error and the 
discounting principle (Bradford & Garrett, 1995). The fundamental attribution error 
posits that individuals show a tendency of attributing the responsibility of unethical 
behavior to stable personal dispositions of the actor (e.g., selfishness, irresponsibility, 
etc.). Thus, should a perpetrator fail to provide information regarding the context of his or 
her behavior, observers will tend to ascribe the cause of the negative action to the actor’s 
disposition (Bradford & Garrett, 1995). The discounting principle asserts that since 
individuals form judgments based solely on information available to them, if other 
appropriate explanations regarding the unethical behavior are given, this additional 
information may be used to discount the negative nature of the action and consequently to 
affect their judgments (Kelly, 1973). 
Based on the fact that an organization may influence individuals’ perceptions of a 
negative action by presenting additional explanations about that action, a stream of 
impression management research identifies four communicative response strategies that 
can be offered in organizational crises (Garrett et al., 1989, p. 511).  
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1) Denials: Denials are statements that deny the occurrence or existence of the 
questionable event, or deny that the accused organization is the cause of the 
event.  
2) Excuses: Excuses are statements that argue that the accused organization 
should not be held responsible for the occurrence and/or impact of the 
questionable event because certain factors limited the organization’s control 
over the occurrence and/or impact of this event. 
3) Justifications: Justifications are statements that argue that, even though the 
accused organizations are responsible for the questionable event, the standards 
being used by the accusers to evaluate the event’s impact are inappropriate. 
4) Concession: Concessions are statements that agree that the questionable event 
did occur, that the accused organization caused this event, that the accused 
organization had control over the occurrence and/or impact of this event, and 
that the evaluative standards being used by the accusers are appropriate. 
In addition to defining four distinctive communicative responses to crises, this 
research stream, more importantly, asserts that selecting an appropriate communicative 
response which best fits the situational characteristic of the negative event is far more 
important than simply offering just any communicative response (Garrett et al., 1989). 
That is, to be effective, a response should be selected that accords with the crisis 
situation. The corporate communicative response model (Bradford & Garrett, 1995) well 
presents the importance of the matching between crisis communication strategies and 
crisis situations. This model identifies four crisis situations: commission, control, 
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standards, and agreement and presents how each of the communicative responses can be 
used under each of the four different situations as follows (Bradford & Garrett, 1995, p. 
878): 
1) When an accused actor can provide evidence that he/she did not commit an 
allegedly unethical action (commission situation), this actor should deny it. 
2) When an accused actor can provide evidence that he/she did not have control 
over the occurrence and/or impact of an allegedly unethical action (control 
situation), this actor should offer an excuse. 
3) When an accused actor can provide evidence that inappropriate standards are 
being used to evaluate this allegedly unethical action (standards situation), this 
actor should offer a justification. 
4) When an accused actor concludes that the allegations raised are valid 
(agreement situation), the actor should offer a concession. 
Based on the corporate communicative response model, Bradford and Garrett 
(1995) suggest that even though a particular communicative response (e.g., denial) is not 
always the best strategy in a particular situation (e.g., commission situation), in certain 
crisis situations certain response strategies outperform others. For example, in an 
agreement situation, a justification or a concession result in positive corporate image 
scores; in terms of consumer evaluations a denial or an excuse are worse than no 
response at all. Huang’s (2006) study further validated the corporate communicative 
response model. It investigated the relationships among crisis response strategies (denial, 
excuse, justification, and concession), crisis situations (commission, control, standards, 
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and agreement) and media coverage. The study’s results revealed that the use of denial in 
a commission situation, justification in a standards situation, and concession in an 
agreement situation increased positive media coverage. Taken all together, the corporate 
communicative response model suggests that research on the effectiveness of crisis 
communication strategies should be dealt with within a crisis context. 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) is another significant 
theoretical foundation that sheds light on what goes into effective corporate crisis 
communication. SCCT provides a theoretical link between crisis communication 
strategies and crisis situations. Earlier research on crisis communication simply lists crisis 
response strategies and highlights the selection of appropriate response strategies 
according to situational characteristics (e.g., Garrett et al., 1989; Bradford & Garrett, 
1995). In contrast, SCCT elaborates on the relations between two constructs – crisis 
communication strategies and crisis situations – by introducing the concept of “crisis 
responsibility,” drawn from attribution theory (Coombs, 2007a). Put another way, SCCT 
focuses on the complexity of a corporate crisis by suggesting situational factors. It also 
shows, in theory, how the influence of such situational factors is related to the 
effectiveness of crisis response strategies and how the effects of crisis communication 
strategies consequently affect organizational reputation and behavioral intention 
(Coombs, 2007b).  
SCCT analyzes three elements of crisis situations – crisis responsibility, crisis 
history, and prior relationship reputation. SCCT tries to determine how these elements 
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may affect the threat to a company’s reputation. That is to say, it tries to determine how 
much damage a company will sustain if it offers no response in a crisis (Coombs, 2007b). 
Crisis responsibility refers to the degree to which the public blame the organization for 
the crisis event (Coombs 1998). It has often been operationalized in the crisis 
management literature as crisis type (Coombs, 2007a, 2007b). Crisis type represents a 
frame that indicates how the public should interpret a crisis event (Coombs, 2007b). That 
is, the type of crisis affects attributions of corporate responsibility and thus influences a 
corporation’s level of responsibility. On the other hand, crisis history indicates whether 
an organization has had the same crisis in the past (Coombs, 2007b). A history of crisis 
may be a factor in the threat to reputation. Finally, prior relationship reputation refers to 
an organization’s relational reputation with stakeholders in other contexts (Coombs, 
2007b). If an organization has treated stakeholders well in other organizational contexts, 
a crisis is likely to be perceived as a single distinctive case; the distinctiveness of the 
crisis may serve as a factor in reducing the threat to the company’s reputation. Crisis 
responsibility is directly related to organizational reputation, according to Coombs’s 
(2007a) crisis situation model of SCCT. The other two factors – crisis history and prior 
relationship reputation — not only directly affect organizational reputation, but also 
indirectly influence it by affecting crisis responsibility. Of the three factors, SCCT 
researchers have devoted most of their attention to crisis responsibility.  
As noted earlier, crisis responsibility has been researched as a form of crisis type. 
Crises come in all forms. They range from small-scale organizational issues to natural 
disasters. Crisis management literature has employed a variety of ways to identify crisis 
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typology. Lerbinger (1977) grouped crises into seven categories: natural crises, 
technological crises, confrontational crises, crises of malevolence, crises of management 
values, crises of deception, and crises of management misconduct. Based on attribution 
theory (Weiner 1986), Coombs and Holladay (1996) formulated crisis typology into such 
categories as accidents, transgressions, faux pas, and terrorism. To understand how a 
crisis is classified, it is necessary to know its elements. One is control. The two 
dimensions of control are internal (by the organization itself) and external (by some 
agents outside of the organization). Another element is intentionality— did the crisis 
happen on purpose. Hence, an accident is unintentional and internal; a transgression is 
intentional and internal; a faux pasis unintentional and external; and terrorism is 
intentional and external. Coombs (1999) later proposed five major categories of crises: 
misdeeds (organizational misdeeds and human breakdowns), accidents (technical 
breakdowns, challenges, workplace violence, and mega-damage), malevolence, natural 
disaster, and rumors. On the other hand, Coombs and Holladay (2002) grouped crisis 
typology into three clusters that generate similar levels of crisis responsibility: victim 
cluster (natural disaster, workplace violence, product tampering, and rumor), accidental 
cluster (technical-error accident, technical-error product harm, and challenge) and 
intentional cluster (human-error accident, human-error product harm, and organizational 
misdeed).  
Research regarding the effects of crisis type has often zeroed in on two types – 
accident and transgression. Consumers are more likely to attribute responsibility to a 
corporation for a transgression crisis than for an accident crisis (Cho &Gower, 2006; 
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Kim, Kim, & Cameron, 2008). This different attribution of corporate responsibility for 
the crisis event affects consumers’ perceptions of and attitudes toward the corporation. 
For example, consumers exposed to news of an accident crisis, one study found, 
perceived a corporation more positively than those exposed to a transgression crisis 
(Coombs & Holladay, 1996). When pre-test and post-test ratings of credibility of and 
attitude toward the corporation are compared, larger changes have been found in the 
condition of the transgression crisis than the condition of the accident crisis (Kim & 
Choi, 2012). In a similar vein, crisis type – accident or transgression – affects consumers’ 
perceptions of ad credibility. Consumers are more likely to believe a corporate ad 
message from a company that caused a crisis by accident than from one that caused a 
crisis through a transgression (Kim & Choi, 2012).  
The primary focus of SCCT research is to help a company choose the best crisis 
response strategy for a particular crisis situation. Hence, another main component of 
SCCT is crisis response strategy. Coombs (2007a) first grouped crisis communication 
strategies into two categories: primary and secondary. Within each category, Coombs 
again specifically defined the crisis response strategies. Primary crisis response strategies 
include attacks on the accuser, denial, scapegoat, excuses, justifications, compensation, 
and apologies. Secondary crisis response strategies include reminder, ingratiation, and 
victimage (refer to Appendix B for detailed descriptions). He further arranged the 
response strategies on a continuum going from defensive to accommodative. At the 
defensive end, strategies seek to defend an organization’s position. At the 
accommodative end, strategies seek to protect victims. These strategies have been named 
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according to the level of acceptance of crisis responsibility: deny, diminish, rebuild, and 
reinforce (Coombs, 2004, 2006). Denying strategies (i.e., denial, scapegoat) refuse to 
acknowledge an organization’s involvement in a crisis. Such strategies are effective, of 
course, if an organization can provide evidence of their non-involvement (e.g., rumor 
crises). Diminishing strategies (i.e., excuse, justification) seek to reduce an organization’s 
responsibility for a crisis event by emphasizing its lack control over the crisis. Thus, 
diminishing strategies will be more effective in an accidental cluster than in a preventable 
cluster. Rebuilding strategies (i.e., compensation, apology) attempt to offset any negative 
images caused by a crisis and, by offering forms of aid to victims, restore a company’s 
reputation. Therefore, rebuilding strategies are effective in the preventable cluster or in 
the accidental cluster with a crisis history and/or unfavorable prior relationship 
reputation. Lastly, reinforcing strategies (i.e., bolstering, ingratiation) try to develop 
reputational assets by reminding the public of past good works or by praising 
stakeholders. Reinforcing strategies are best used as secondary crisis response strategies 
along with the three primary strategies (Coombs 2007a).  
Context-Oriented Crisis Communication Strategies  
As it explores the effectiveness of crisis response strategies, SCCT literature 
highlights the importance of situational factors. The importance of situational factors is 
validated by the contradictory results found in crisis communication literature. Some 
studies that demonstrated that, regardless of the crisis situation, concession 
communicative responses are more effective than less accommodating ones (Bradford & 
Garrett, 1995; Coombs, 1996; Lyon & Cameron, 2004; Huang, 2006). Other researchers, 
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however, challenge the notion that concession is one of the most effective communicative 
strategies in crisis situations (Huang, 2008; Dardis & Haigh, 2009). As mentioned above, 
a crisis situation, far from being simple, has many facets. It should thus be studied from a 
perspective that is more complex, dynamic, and multifaceted. Doing so will help a 
company apprehend the situation and find the most effective crisis communicative 
strategy. Hence, a company must identify potential situational factors. Such efforts would 
expand the current SCCT literature and offer more specific and practical 
recommendations to crisis managers/communicators. 
Some substantial studies have explored situational factors that should be taken 
into account in a corporate crisis context. Based on the framing theory, Cho and Gower 
(2006) emphasized the role of media in a corporate crisis situation. It has been argued 
that media, and how it chooses to frame an issue, can affect the public’s perceptions, 
opinions, or attitudes about a crisis (Entman, 1993). Their results showed that framing a 
transgression crisis as a human-interest story affected readers’ attributions of the crisis. 
That is, consumers, feeling a strong emotional response, ascribed more responsibility to 
the corporation than when the crisis was not framed as a human-interest story. Kim and 
Cameron (2011) also investigated the effect of different news frames (anger-inducing 
crisis news vs. sadness-inducing crisis news) on readers’ attitudes. They found that 
between news frames that induced anger and those that induced sadness, the former 
generated more negative attitudes regarding the corporation’s responsibility. This finding 
implies that media’s viewpoint on a crisis event (news framing) influences perceptions of 
and attitudes toward an organizational crisis. 
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Past research suggests that, in addition to the media, consumer perception of an 
on-going crisis is affected by corporate reputation. Siomkos and Kurzbard (1994) found 
that when a crisis involved a reputable and well-known company, consumers perceived 
as relatively small the degree of danger associated with it. Mowen (1979) also showed 
that corporate reputation influenced consumer response to product recalls; a familiar 
company was blamed less for a product defect than was an unfamiliar company. 
Similarly, Mowen, Jolly, and Nickell (1981) showed that consumers perceived a product 
defect differently depending on a corporation’s reputation. As might be assumed, when a 
company is confronted with a crisis, in particular, a product failure, favorable corporate 
reputation lessens blame attribution (Laczniak, DeCarlo, &Ramaswami, 2001) and, to 
some extent, protects a corporation from damage (Lyon & Cameron 2004). 
Another study (Laufer & Coombs, 2006) that investigated a product-harm crisis 
context argued that the perceived severity of a crisis impacts blame attribution. 
Robbennolt (2000) found that when outcomes resulting from a crisis event were severe, 
people were more likely to attribute responsibility than if the outcomes were mild. 
Interestingly, Laufer and Coombs (2006) also suggested that individual characteristics, in 
particular, gender and cultural difference, affect perceptions of crisis severity; they are 
thus significant factors in determining consumer attributions of blame. According to the 
literature, women, more than men, have a tendency of perceiving negative events as more 
severe (Harris & Miller, 2000; Laufer & Gillespie, 2004). The underlying explanation of 
this argument is that women are more likely to be concerned that an accident could 
happen to them. This sense of vulnerability makes them view the event as more severe. 
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And women’s tendency of perceiving a crisis to be more severe results in stronger blame 
attributions (Laufer & Gillespie, 2004). Furthermore, people from different countries may 
differ in their perceptions of crises. Hofstede (1997) defined one cultural dimension that 
affects consumer blame attributions (Laufer & Coombs, 2006), uncertainty avoidance. 
That is, people in countries that rank high in uncertainty avoidance show stronger 
reaction toward a product-harm crisis than those in countries that rank lower in this 
cultural dimension (Taylor, 2000). The literature on tolerance for ambiguity further 
supports the links among uncertainty avoidance, perceptions of crisis severity, and the 
attributions of crisis responsibility to a corporation (Laufer et al., 2005).  
Another interesting research trend found in the literature is scholars’ going 
beyond simply comparing which type of crisis communication response is more effective. 
They have begun looking at other factors to moderate the effectiveness of a crisis 
response strategy. Dutta and Pullig (2011) argued that the relative effectiveness of the 
response strategies to crises may depend on crisis type. The results of the study indicated 
that corrective action was found to be a more effective response strategy for a 
performance-related brand crisis (i.e., defective product) than reduction-of-offensiveness 
or denial. On the other hand, for a value-related brand crisis (i.e., social or ethical issues), 
reduction-of-offensive was just as effective as corrective action. Another study by Kim 
(2002) investigated the effects of the severity of crisis and organizational responsibility 
on crisis communication strategies. The findings suggest that, in a condition of low 
responsibility and low severity, an organization should attack the accuser or deny the 
crisis event. If responsibility is low but severity high, then the organization should use an 
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excuse response. While in the case of high responsibility and low severity, justification 
and ingratiation are two effective response strategies; in the case of high responsibility 
and high severity, corrective action or a full apology are two strategies that are advisable.  
Still other studies have focused on how the manner of crisis communication 
moderates the effect of crisis communication strategies. Claeys and Cauberghe (2011) 
examined how the timing of crisis disclosure (ex-ante vs. ex-post) moderates the effect of 
crisis response strategies (response strategy vs. objective crisis information only) on post-
crisis organizational reputation. Their results suggest that when a corporation discloses its 
own crisis before it is discovered by a third party (ex-ante), it can produce the same 
impact on organizational credibility by offering objective crisis information as it can by 
using a crisis response strategy (e.g., apology, denial, scapegoat, etc.). If it waits until 
after a third party discovers a crisis (ex-post), a company will fail to produce the same 
impact by providing objective crisis information. It is then necessary to employ crisis 
response strategies such as apology. Coombs and Holladay (2009) examined how the 
channel of a crisis response message (print vs. video) affects the effect of response 
strategies/contents (sympathy vs. compassion) on perceptions of organizational 
reputation, perceptions of anger, anticipated negative word-of-mouth, and perceptions of 
account. They, however, failed to find any impact.  
As discussed earlier, individual characteristics (e.g., gender, cultural difference, 
etc.) have been found to influence crisis-related consumer behavior. Only a few studies 
have explored the role of individual characteristics on the effect of crisis communication 
strategies. According to Claeys, Cauberghe, and Vyncke (2010), a person’s locus of 
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control has a moderating impact on the effect of crisis communication strategies on 
corporate reputation. They found that denying strategies were more effective with people 
having an external locus of control and that diminishing strategies were the same for both 
groups. In addition, Dawar and Pillutla (2000) investigated whether consumers’ prior 
expectations play a moderating factor in the effectiveness of different types of corporate 
crisis responses. Their results indicated that even if exposed to a product-harm crisis, 
people with stronger prior expectations are less likely to lose brand equity compared to 
those with weak prior expectations in all three response strategies (unambiguous support, 
ambiguous response, and unambiguous stonewalling response).  
These previous context-oriented crisis communication studies reflect one trend: in 
a crisis event, individual as well as environmental characteristics (i.e., media-related, 
crisis-related, corporation-related, or crisis response-related) are seen as variables of 
attributions of responsibility, respectively. This perspective, however, overlooks the 
relationships among these variables. That is, the previous literature has shown the impact 
of each of the situational factors on the effect of crisis communication strategies on 
consumer responses. Little is known, however, about how the relationships among 
situational components (i.e., a crisis, a corporation, a consumer) serve as another 
situational factor. Thus, the current study, by including two concepts – consumer-
company identification and corporate associations-crisis type congruence – in a crisis 
context, attempts to seek to discover their roles in the effectiveness of crisis 
communication strategies.  
Corporate Identity, Consumer-Company Identification and Corporate Associations 
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Corporate identity and corporate associations are two central concepts in 
corporate management, corporate-level marketing, and corporate brand (Dacin & Brown, 
2002). Corporate identity refers to “the features, characteristics, traits or attributes of a 
company that are presumed to be central, distinctive and enduring” (He & Mukherjee, 
2009, p. 1). Corporate identity refers to the intended characteristics of a company in 
which decision makers or marketers attempt to promote to external and internal 
constituents. On the other hand, the concept of corporate associations, derived from 
research in psychology on associative network models of memory, refer to any kinds of 
emotions, feelings, beliefs, evaluations, etc. about a company with which the external and 
internal constituents (e.g., consumers) are associated (Dacin & Brown, 2002). Therefore, 
the ideal relationship between corporate identity and corporate associations is that 
individuals are associated with a company as intended characteristics promoted by the 
company (i.e., corporate identity). However, it is often the case that the intended 
characteristics of the company are not the same as consumers’ associations with the 
company.  
Despite the growing literature on corporate identity, little research has been 
conducted on exploring the link between corporate identity and corporate associations. 
Corporate identity has been studied from a corporate management or strategic marketing 
perspective, yet not much has been researched from a consumer-marketing perspective 
(He & Mukherjee, 2009). In this respect, consumer-company identification is an 
important concept in explaining the interactive mechanism of corporate identity and 
corporate associations from a consumer’s point of view (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Bick, 
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Jacobson, & Abratt, 2003; He & Mukherjee, 2009). Consumer-company identification 
refers to a consumer’s identification with a company, an identification that helps the 
consumer satisfy important self-definitional needs (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). 
Therefore, identification occurs when consumers perceive an overlap between their own 
identities and the associations they hold with a company (Dacin & Brown, 2002). Recent 
research suggests that consumer identification with a company affects consumers’ 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses (Ahearne, Bhattacharya, & Gruen, 2005; 
He & Mukherjee, 2009), but the role of consumer-company identification in consumer 
marketing contexts still remains unclear. 
In this regard, what follows are three justifications for taking a closer look at 
consumer-company identification and corporate associations-crisis type congruence as 
situational factors that influence the effectiveness of different types of crisis 
communicative strategies. First, despite such a central concept in the areas of corporate 
management and marketing, researchers have made little effort to understand the role of 
consumer-company identification and corporate associations in corporate crisis contexts. 
Second, as suggested by contingency theory (Zhang, Qiu, & Cameron, 2004), the 
individual characteristics of an organization and the public influence the organization’s 
PR strategies. Nevertheless, previous literature on crisis communication strategy 
effectiveness has focused mainly on the effect of crisis-related factors (e.g., crisis type, 
crisis severity), and have relatively neglected consumer-related (e.g., consumer-company 
identification) or company-related factors (e.g., corporate associations). Third, previous 
research has examined a single component/variable as a crisis situational factor. 
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However, the present study explores the effect of between-component relationships (e.g., 
consumer and company, company and crisis) on crisis communication strategies. The 
application of relevant and useful concepts (i.e., consumer-company identification, 
corporate associations-crisis type congruence) in unexamined diverse crisis 
communication domains are recommended because such efforts should yield missing 
information that is both theoretical and pragmatic.  
Consumer-Company Identification in a Crisis 
Some previous studies show that consumer-company identification enhances 
consumers’ resilience to negative information about a company. That is, consumers who 
strongly identify with a company are likely to perceive more favorably any negative 
information about the company than will those who weakly identify with the company 
(Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Einwiller et al., 2006).  
According to motivated reasoning theory (Kunda, 1990), when people process 
information and form judgments, they are motivated either to arrive at either an accurate 
conclusion or a desired one. If they are searching for a particular conclusion, individuals 
process information in a dramatically biased manner. If searching for accuracy, they do 
so in an unbiased manner. Motivation may be determined by such consumer 
characteristics as brand commitment, or consumer-company identification. Ahluwalia et 
al. (2000) found that when commitment to a brand is lower, consumers evaluate negative 
information about the brand in a less biased and more diagnostic manner. When 
commitment to a brand is higher, they are more likely to process information in a biased 
fashion. Such different fashions of information processing consequently affect consumer 
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response to negative publicity. Since high-commitment consumers are more likely to 
engage in defensive information processing, they tend to resist attitude change when 
presented negative information (Feldman & Lynch, 1988). 
Related to the context of the present study, let’s suppose that one is exposed to 
negative information about a company. If one identifies highly with the company, the 
negative information may hurt one’s self-defining beliefs because one sees the company 
as important to one’s sense of self. Thus, one would likely be biased in processing the 
information so as to arrive at a positive conclusion. Doing so protects self-defining 
beliefs and the meaningful relationship with the company. If, however, one weakly 
identifies with the company, one would likely be motivated to process the information for 
accuracy. The negative information, in this case, is not a threat at all to one’s sense of 
identity. Thus, wanting to form a correct judgment, one gives weight to negative 
information (Ahluwalia, 2002). One’s beliefs about and attitude toward the company 
may, in such manner, be more easily swayed (Einwiller et al., 2006). 
Einwiller et al. (2006) examined how consumer-company identification 
influences perceptions of negative information about a company. They found that 
strongly identified consumers had, after being exposed to negative publicity about a 
company, less negative corporate associations, more favorable attitudes, and behavioral 
intentions than did weakly identified consumers. However, this pattern was found only in 
the case of moderately negative publicity, yet given extremely negative information, 
consumer identification with a company failed to work as expected. This is because 
minor or moderately negative information is not bad enough to sway people from 
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arriving at a desired conclusion. However, extremely negative information exceeds even 
strongly identified consumers’ forgiving levels of tolerance (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003). 
In such cases, these consumers adopt a highly diagnostic and unbiased manner (Herr, 
Kardes, & Kim, 1991). Therefore, consumer-company identification works only within a 
zone of tolerance.  
Although in the context of corporate crises not a great deal of empirical research 
has examined the effect of consumer-company identification, identification effects can be 
found in celebrity endorsement literature. Findings from research on consumer-celebrity 
identification may shed some light on the role of consumer-company identification in a 
crisis situation. Consumer-celebrity identification, some studies suggest, affects 
consumer responses to negative information about a celebrity endorser. Johnson (2005) 
found that consumers strongly identified with a celebrity were more likely than weakly 
identified consumers to believe that the celebrity was innocent and to be willing to 
purchase and recommend the product endorsed by the celebrity. The study also showed 
that highly identifying with a celebrity led to the feeling of pride about being a fan. 
Conversely, a low level of identification led to a feeling of guilt and shame about being 
connected with the celebrity. In a similar vein, Um (2011) empirically examined how 
identification with a celebrity endorser influenced attitudes toward the brand and 
purchase intention when the celebrity endorser was involved in unethical behavior. He 
found that when exposed to negative publicity, people who are strongly identified with 
the celebrity had less negative brand attitudes and greater purchase intention compared to 
those less identified with the celebrity. These findings suggest that the degree to which 
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consumers indentify with a celebrity plays a role in shaping their reactions to bad press 
about a celebrity. If such a finding can be applied to the current context, a similar 
relationship may be found between the consumer-company identification and negative 
information about the company.  
Consumer-company identification may influence not only the tolerance of 
negative publicity about a company but also the level of forgiveness shown toward a 
company. Interpersonal forgiveness serves as a rationalization for this argument. 
Forgiveness has been defined as a pro-social change toward the offender despite the 
offender’s negative action (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). To shed light on 
the process of forgiveness, several studies highlight the nature of the relationship between 
a victim and an offender (McCullough et al., 1998). Closeness or commitment to an 
offender has been found to facilitate forgiveness. Finkel et al. (2002) found that the more 
dependent people are on and satisfied with their relationship with an offender, the more 
likely they are to forgive him or her. Karrenmans and Aarts (2007) also demonstrated that 
we are quicker to forgive those close to us. 
This tendency to forgive those close to us might be a tendency that can be found 
between a consumer and a company enduring a crisis. What is closeness between a 
consumer and a company manifested? Consumer-company identification may be one 
such manifestation. If so, it is expected that highly identified consumers are more likely 
to forgive a company for minor mistakes. Identification encourages consumers’ trust in a 
company, facilitating more charitable attributions regarding the company’s culpability in 
wrongdoings (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Hibbard et al., 2001; Kramer, 1991). 
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Previous Studies on Corporate Associations  
Much of the research on corporate associations appears in the literature of 
corporate image. Early studies mainly focused on developing measures of such concepts 
as corporate image, corporate associations, and a person’s perception of a firm. It did not 
focus on finding theoretical links between such concepts and consumer responses. 
Although absent from consumer marketing literature, a substantial number of studies 
have explored the role of corporate associations in the context of relationships between a 
company and its product.  
In particular, researchers have identified several classifications of corporate 
associations. Two of these –corporate ability (CA) and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) –dominate the literature on relationships between corporate associations and 
consumer responses. CA associations refer to consumer beliefs and feelings that relate to 
a company’s expertise or competence in developing and delivering its product, service 
and so forth.CSR associations refer to consumer beliefs and feelings that relate to a 
company’s status and activities with respect to its perceived societal obligations (Dacin & 
Brown, 2002). These two dimensions of corporate associations are consistent with two 
dimensions of corporate identity conceptualized by David, Kline, and Dai (2005), 
corporate expertise and corporate social responsibility. According to them, corporate 
expertise is corporate ability to be the leader in a product or service category by 
satisfying consumers’ needs, wants, and desires. Corporate social responsibility, on the 
other hand, focuses on corporate commitment to societal well-being by pursuing ethical, 
moral, and social obligations for mutual benefits between an organization and the public.  
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CA and CSR associations may differ in how they affect consumer responses. 
Brown and Dacin (1997) investigated how two types of corporate associations of CA and 
CSR affect consumer evaluations of a new product. Their results suggested that two types 
of corporate associations have dual influence on new product evaluations, yet affect them 
in different ways. The data from the first study, which used fictitious companies, 
demonstrated that both types of corporate associations positively influence product 
responses by affecting corporate evaluations. However, CA associations were found to be 
a stronger predictor of affecting product evaluations by affecting product sophistication. 
Yet while the indirect effect of CSR associations on product evaluations through product 
social responsibility was positive, it was not significant. Furthermore, the second study, 
which used real companies, yielded interesting findings. Two types of corporate 
associations were positively related to corporate evaluation, yet such evaluations 
appeared to negatively affect new product evaluations. The converse of this finding 
implies that consumers are not necessarily destined to give negative evaluations to new 
products from companies with which they have negative associations. Their final study 
explained this unexpected negative relationship by what is known as a contrast effect. 
The contrast effect may occur when a new product is evaluated in light of its corporate 
context based on CA associations; it is manifested when a company with negative CA 
associations puts out a new product that garners favorable consumer responses. The 
contrast effect, however, does not occur in a corporate context having CSR associations. 
This suggests that a new product put out by a company with negative CSR associations 
will receive negative product evaluations.   
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A study by Berens, Riel, and Bruggen (2005) shows that other factors moderate 
the relationship between corporate associations and new product evaluations differently 
according to types of corporate associations. The authors investigated first, how the 
effects of CA associations and CSR associations are moderated by perceived fit between 
a company and a product, and involvement that people have with a product. Second, they 
investigated how these moderating effects of fit and involvement are in turn moderated 
by corporate brand dominance. The results indicated that when the corporate brand is 
dominantly visible, CA associations have a strong impact, independent of fit and 
involvement. CSR associations, in contrast, have no influence, independent of fit and 
involvement. When the corporate brand is less visible, the effect of CA associations is 
positively moderated by involvement, but the effect of CSR associations is negatively 
moderated by involvement and positively moderated by fit. This implies that moderating 
factors on the effects of corporate associations work in different ways according to 
corporate contexts of CA associations and CSR associations. 
Other researchers suggest another classification of corporate associations. For 
instance, Madrigal (2000) explored the effect of two types of corporate associations – 
corporate excitement and corporate environmental friendliness on new product 
evaluations and responses (i.e., product’s trendiness and product’s environmental 
friendliness). The study further examined how the effect of corporate associations is 
moderated by the perceived fit between a company’s image (corporate associations) and 
the new product. According to the study’s findings, a good fit between corporate 
associations and product extension is likely to lead to stronger effects of corporate 
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associations on product responses. In cases of a poor fit between corporate associations 
and product extension, consumers are likely to rely on product-related benefits and 
attributes rather than using corporate associations as the basis of their overall judgments 
of a new product. 
Corporate Associations in a Crisis Context 
Empirical evidence suggests that corporate associations play a central role in the 
processing of new product-relevant information. In addition, the perceived fit between a 
company image/corporate associations and a new product has been found to play a 
significant role in influencing corporate associations. Although little research has been 
conducted about the effect of corporate associations in a crisis context, some substantial 
studies provide reasonable findings to support the role of corporate associations when a 
company faces a crisis. Similar to Madrigal’s (2000) study, Romeo (1991) explored the 
moderating effect of perceived fit between family brand and brand extension in the 
context of a brand crisis. The study examined how category similarity between the family 
brand and brand extension moderates the effect of negative information about the brand 
extension on the evaluations of it and on the family brand’s image. The findings suggest 
that when the similarity between the extension’s product category and the family brand is 
high, negative information is more detrimental to evaluations of brand extension and the 
family brand image. In short, when introducing a new product that is closely related to 
the company’s or family brand’s image, corporate associations/corporate image can serve 
as useful information in forming judgments about a new product/brand extension 
(Madrigal 2000). When, however, the product/brand extension is involved in a negative 
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event, the perceived fit between the product/brand extension the company/family brand 
image may rather backfire on the company/family brand. This adverse effect from the 
congruence between corporate associations/image and a new product in the crisis context 
suggests another research question: How does the perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type work in consumer responses.  
Perceived Fit between Corporate Associations and Crisis Type 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no research has been conducted on the role 
of perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type in a corporate crisis 
context. However, some previous studies seem to validate the impulse to investigate this 
research question. Dawar and Lei (2009) argue that the relevance of the crisis to the 
brand’s key benefit associations influences the perceived seriousness of a crisis and the 
effect of the crisis on brand evaluations. According to their findings, the effect of a brand 
crisis is more adverse on brand evaluations when it is relevant to the brand’s key 
associations. This is especially true for consumers familiar with the brand. This finding 
implies that a good fit between corporate associations and a crisis type may negatively 
influence consumer response in a corporate crisis. 
This argument is rationalized by the concept of betrayal. While betrayal has been 
studied in interpersonal communication and organizational behavior, it has recently been 
introduced to consumer research. In organizational behavior literature, betrayal is defined 
as “a voluntary violation of mutually known pivotal expectations of the trustor by the 
trusted party (trustee), which has the potential to threaten the well-being of the trustor,” 
(Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998, p. 548). Betrayal has also been defined as a perceived 
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violation of a psychological contract by another (Morrison & Robinson, 1997). In the 
current context, the author defines consumer betrayal as a perceived violation of a 
consumer’s psychological contract with a company.  
Researchers know little about the role of betrayal in the domain of corporate 
crises. The consumer-retailer relationship literature, however, lends some logic to the 
assumption that consumers may feel betrayed when their expectations of a company are 
violated by a particular crisis event. The previous studies suggest that consumers feel 
betrayed when their expectations are not satisfied due to service failures or price policies 
(Price & Bardhi, 2001). Particularly, the violation of positive expectations and trust 
relationships or the broken implicit and explicit promises lead to greater feelings of 
betrayal and precipitate a desire to punish the betrayer (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003). 
Speaking of betrayal in this context, consumers’ positive expectations of a company, 
which are infused by corporate associations in a normal and non-crisis situation, may be 
threatened by a particular corporate crisis closely related to the corporate associations that 
consumers have with the company. Such violated expectations would then turn to 
feelings of betrayal. That is, if consumers’ positive expectations based on particular 
corporate associations in a routine situation are violated by a crisis event, their feeling of 
betrayal would be just as great as their positive feelings had been for the company’s key 
associations in a non-crisis situation. 
Consistent with this logic, brand personality literature helps us understand the role 
of the fit between corporate associations and crisis type. For example, Aaker, Fournier, 
and Brasel (2004) found that after a transgression occurred, the company-customer 
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relationship was weakened for only a sincere brand. For an exciting brand, the 
transgression did not affect the relationships. This suggests that the effect of a 
transgression/crisis differs depending upon brand personality. Consumers tend to 
establish more robust relationships with a sincere brand over time, like a close 
partnership, compared to an exciting brand. Once this relationship is broken, however, by 
a transgression, consumers are more likely to turn against the sincere brand. Their sense 
of betrayal is as great as was their former trust in the brand. From this, it might be 
assumed that in a routine situation corporate associations facilitate consumer trust in a 
certain part of corporate identity (CA or CSR). At the same time, when a crisis related to 
the corporate key associations occurs, the company-crisis congruence also aggravates 
consumers’ feelings of betrayal.  
Drawn from the above review of literature in the related areas, the next chapter 
develops and proposes hypotheses that examine the moderating roles of consumer-
company identification and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type in 
determining consumer responses to corporation’s crisis communication strategies.  
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CHPATER III:  HYPOTHESES 
The study proposes two sets of relationships. First, there is the relationship 
between crisis communication strategies and consumer responses toward the response 
strategies. Second, the study proposes that the relationship is moderated by a degree of 
consumer-company identification and by a degree of perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type. 
Previous studies have found that consumer-company identification enhances 
consumers’ resilience to negative information about a company. That is, consumers who 
strongly identify themselves with a company are likely to view negative information 
about the company with a less critical eye than those who weakly identify themselves 
with the company. In addition, other relevant literature suggests that corporate 
associations-crisis type congruence may influence consumer evaluations of a 
company/brand involved in a crisis. Not a few previous studies have identified potential 
factors influencing the effectiveness of crisis response strategies. However, the 
moderating roles of consumer-company identification and corporate associations-crisis 
type congruence have, up to now, rarely been examined in the crisis communication 
research domain.  
Consumer-Company Identification and Crisis Communication Strategy 
 
Despite the lack of empirical evidence, literature on motivated reasoning theory, 
forgiveness theory, and consumer-celebrity identification studies provide theoretical 
foundations to explore the relationship between the degree of identification between a 
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consumer and a company, and consumer responses to the key types of crisis 
communicative strategies (i.e., excuse, compensation, apology).  
The wisdom is that a crisis communication strategy that is more accommodative 
will be more effective. For instance, an apology has been found to be more effective than 
denials, excuses, or justifications (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Dean, 2004; Lyon & 
Cameron, 2004). However, in some circumstances, a full accommodative strategy (e.g., 
apology) may in fact backfire on a company. A company that accepts full responsibility 
and asks for forgiveness (Benoit & Drew, 1997; Fuchs-Burnett, 2002) brings on itself the 
greatest financial burden and leaves the impression that the company is totally 
responsible for the crisis event (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). Therefore, from a 
company’s perspective, even if the apology strategy is believed to be the most effective, 
it should be exercised with caution. Scholars in crisis management point out that a crisis 
communication strategy should be appropriately selected based on the crisis situation. For 
instance, when a company is embroiled in rumor mongering and has evidence to refute 
such rumors, denial is the effective response strategy. Or when a company is involved in 
an accident crisis, excuse may be used as an effective crisis communication strategy. In 
such instances, is the selected crisis communication strategy perceived as effective to all 
consumers? If every consumer has a different level of identification with the company, 
how does such consumer-company identification influence the effectiveness of the 
selected crisis communication strategy?  
As suggested in previous studies (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Einwiller et al., 
2006), consumers who are highly identified with a company are likely to protect their 
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existing beliefs about and attitudes toward the company when exposed to negative 
information about the company. Therefore, their information processing of the corporate 
crisis is biased so as to arrive at a particular desired conclusion. This is because since 
highly identified consumers perceive the company as a part of their selves and use the 
company as one of the tools to express their self-defining beliefs and needs, the crisis 
may even psychologically disturb their self-identity. On the other hand, consumers less 
identified with the company would attempt to process the negative information about the 
company in a more diagnostic and unbiased manner so as to reach an accurate 
conclusion. Hence, they would give more weight to negative information (Ahluwalia, 
2002). Their beliefs about and attitudes toward the company consequently may be more 
easily swayed (Einwiller et al., 2006). 
Suppose both consumer groups are exposed to the same crisis information; their 
attributions of corporate responsibility for the crisis may differ depending on their 
motivation of information processing. It is assumed here that highly identified consumers 
are less likely to attribute the responsibility of a crisis to the company, whereas less 
identified consumers are more likely to attribute the responsibility of the crisis to the 
company. Furthermore, a strong link exists between closeness and forgiveness in 
interpersonal communication literature (Finkel et al., 2002; Karrenmans & Aarts, 2007). 
This link lends a logic to the argument that highly identified consumers with a company 
may be more likely to forgive the company. Identification increases consumers’ 
interactions with the company, which leads them to trust it and make more charitable 
attributions regarding its intentions about the crisis event.  
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Such different perceptions of corporate responsibility for the crisis based on 
identification with the company would be related to the effectiveness of crisis 
communication strategies. Highly identified consumers may rather expect that the 
company denies intent to do harm and/or claims their inability to control the crisis event. 
That is, for consumers who are not identified with the company, an excuse may be 
perceived as an irresponsible crisis response strategy. For highly identified consumers, it 
may be welcomed and more effective. In many corporate crises that are perceived as 
minor or moderate, consumers’ perceptual and attitudinal responses to the companies’ 
post-crisis communication strategies may be dependent upon their level of consumer-
company identification because strongly identifiers may have biased pattern of 
information processing. That is, highly identified consumers seem to overlook or 
downplay any negative information about the company (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003).  
As discussed previously, comparisons among the response strategies in the same 
crisis result in the argument that an apology is more effective than less accommodative 
strategies such as denial, excuse, or justification (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Dean, 2004; 
Lyon & Cameron, 2004). This finding seems to always be true because apology 
outperforms other response strategies such as denial or excuse which is not a victim-
centered/accommodative strategy. With such unfair comparisons, an apology may easily 
beat out other less accommodative response strategies. Thus, such a common sense 
finding may not provide crisis managers realistic recommendations.  
In this respect, Coombs and Holladay (2008) suggest the importance of unbiased 
comparisons to establish a more realistic assessment of the effectiveness of crisis 
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communication strategies. When comparing apology with more equivalent crisis 
communication strategies such as compensation (the second accommodative strategy on 
the defensive-accommodative continuum), they found that two response strategies have 
similar effects on post-crisis reputation, anger, negative word-of-mouth intentions and 
account acceptance. However, considering the so-true evidence that the more 
accommodative the more effective, a comparison of apology, the so-called best strategy, 
with compensation should be examined in other study contexts. By incorporating the 
concept of consumer-company identification into this comparison, the present study 
attempts to discover the effects of apology and compensation. As earlier noted, 
consumers who are strongly identified with a company are less likely to attribute crisis 
responsibility to the company and are more likely to forgive the company. Compensation, 
a less accommodative, yet more equivalent crisis response would, therefore, for higher 
identified consumers, be perceived as effective as apology, consistent with Coombs and 
Holladay (2008)’s findings. However, such expectation may not exist for less identified 
consumers. Based on the review of relevant literature and logical speculations, the 
following hypotheses are, therefore, postulated: 
H1: Excuse will be more effective for participants with high consumer-company 
identification than for those with low consumer-company identification. More 
specifically, excuse will generate (a) a lower level of feelings of betrayal, (b) a 
higher level of post-crisis corporate reputation evaluations, (c) a higher level of 
corporate credibility evaluations, (d) more favorable attitudes toward the 
company, (e) a lower level of negative word-of-mouth intention, and (f) a higher 
level of purchase intention in the group of participants with high consumer-
company identification than in the group with low consumer-company 
identification. 
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H2: Compensation will be just as effective as apology for participants with high 
consumer-company identification. More specifically, compensation and apology 
will generate (a) similar levels of feelings of betrayal, (b) similar levels of post-
crisis corporate reputation evaluations, (c) similar levels of corporate credibility 
evaluations, (d) similar levels of favorable attitudes toward the company, (e) 
similar levels of negative word-of-mouth intention, and (f) similar levels of 
purchase intention in the group of participants with high consumer-company 
identification. For participants with low consumer-company identification, 
however, apology will be more effective than compensation. More specifically, 
apology will generate (a) a lower level of feelings of betrayal, (b) a higher level of 
post-crisis corporate reputation evaluations, (c) a higher level of corporate 
credibility evaluations, (d) more favorable attitudes toward the company, (e) a 
lower level of negative word-of-mouth intention, and (f) a higher level of 
purchase intention than compensation in the group of participants with low 
consumer-company identification. 
 
Perceived Fit between Corporate Associations and Crisis Type, and Crisis 
Communication Strategy 
 
Despite the lack of empirical evidence to support the role of perceived fit between 
corporate associations and crisis type on consumer responses toward crisis 
communication strategies, the concept of betrayal derived from interpersonal 
communication and organizational behavior literature is used as a rationalization for a 
link between these two constructs. According to consumer-retailer relationship literature, 
consumers feel betrayed when their expectations are not satisfied due to service failures, 
or price policies (Price, Linda, & Bardhi, 2001). In particular, the violation of positive 
expectations and trust relationships or the broken implicit and explicit promises lead to 
greater feelings of betrayal calling for more punishment and generating more negative 
attitudes toward the betrayer (Koehler & Gershoff, 2003). When this logic is applied to 
the current research context, it might be assumed that consumers feel betrayed when their 
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expectations of a company are violated by a particular event/crisis. Consumers’ positive 
expectations of a company are infused by particular corporate associations in normal and 
non-crisis situations. These feelings may be threatened by a particular corporate crisis 
closely related to the corporate associations that consumers hold with the company. Such 
violated expectations would then turn to feelings of betrayal toward the company. In fact, 
their feeling of betrayal would be as great as their positive feelings had been toward the 
company’s key associations in a non-crisis situation. This implies that when a crisis is 
relevant to the company’s key associations, the effect of the crisis will be more adverse 
than when the crisis is not related to the key associations. Dawar and Lei (2009) suggest 
findings that support this argument. According to their findings, the relevance of a crisis 
to a brand’s key benefit associations influences the perceived seriousness of the crisis and 
the effect of the crisis on brand evaluations. Specifically, it is suggested that the effect of 
a brand crisis is more adverse on brand evaluations when a brand crisis is relevant to the 
brand’s key associations especially for consumers who are familiar with the brand.  
Applying the adverse effect of the good fit between brand key associations and a 
crisis type on brand evaluations to the current context, the relevance of crisis to 
company’s key associations may influence the effectiveness of different types of crisis 
communication strategies. Corporate associations facilitate consumer trust in a particular 
corporate identity (e.g., CA, CSR) in a routine situation. At the same time, when a crisis 
is related to the corporate key associations occurs, the company-crisis congruence also 
aggravates consumers’ feelings of betrayal in the crisis. For instance, consumers would 
feel more betrayed when a company with CSR associations faces a charge of unethical 
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behavior than when a company with CA associations is involved in the same negative 
event. The stronger feelings of betrayal would attribute more crisis responsibility to, call 
for more punishment, and generate more negative attitude toward the company. 
Therefore, it is expected that more accommodative crisis communication strategies are 
required when a corporate crisis violates corporate key associations. Based on the review 
of relevant literature and logical speculations, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H3: When company associations (ability) are congruent with a crisis type (a 
product failure), apology will be more effective compared to when the company 
associations are incongruent with crisis type (an ethical violation). More 
specifically, participants who are exposed to the condition of product failure will 
generate (a) a lower level of feelings of betrayal, (b) a higher level of post-crisis 
corporate reputation evaluations, (c) a higher level of corporate credibility 
evaluations, (d) more favorable attitudes toward the company, (e) a lower level of 
negative word-of-mouth intention, and (f) a higher level of purchase intention 
than those who are exposed to the condition of ethical violation.   
 
H4: When company associations (ability) are incongruent with a crisis type (an 
ethical violation), excuse will be more effective than when the company 
associations are congruent with the crisis type (a product failure). More 
specifically, participants who are exposed to the condition of ethical violation will 
generate (a) a lower level of feelings of betrayal, (b) a higher level of post-crisis 
corporate reputation evaluations, (c) a higher level of corporate credibility 
evaluations, (d) more favorable attitudes toward the company, (e) a lower level of 
negative word-of-mouth intention and (f) a higher level of purchase intention than 
those who are exposed to the condition of product failure. 
 
The next chapters will describe two experimental studies in order to examine the 
proposed hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER IV:  STUDY 1 
Study 1 examines the moderating role of consumer-company identification on the 
effect of crisis communication strategy (Hypotheses 1 and 2). This chapter gives an 
overview of Study 1’s design, its major constructs and measurements, the data collection 
procedure, the sampling, results; it also includes a brief discussion. 
METHOD 
Experimental Design 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, the study employs a 3 x 2 between-subject factorial 
design. The two factors are the type of crisis communication strategy (excuse vs. 
compensation vs. apology) and the level of identification with a company (low vs. high). 
The crisis communication strategy, as a manipulated variable, is devised to represent the 
excuse, compensation, or apology strategy. The level of identification with a company, as 
a manipulated variable, is devised to represent groups of low and high identification with 
a company. To manipulate the level of identification with a company, subjects were first 
asked to indicate, from a list of computer manufacturers, the company to which they had 
the most/least sense of connection. They were then given a news article relating a 
negative incident involving the company. Following that, participants were asked to fill 
out a questionnaire.  
Pretests 
Choice of Product Category and Companies 
One of the most critical considerations was whether to use a fictitious or a real 
company. Using a fictitious company could help minimize prior perceptions of or 
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attitudes toward real companies. Using a real company could lend the experiment a 
greater sense of realism. Ultimately, for a study investigating effects of identification, it 
seemed more appropriate to use a real company. Consumer-company identification is 
based on a deep, committed, and meaningful relationship. Using a bogus company would 
likely fail to reflect any true consumer-company identification.  
Another important consideration was whether, in creating two groups of low and 
high identification, to use consumer-company identification as either a measured or a 
manipulated variable. As a measured variable, it could cause a small difference between 
the two conditions of low and high identification. It could therefore require a larger 
sample when trisecting the subjects to compare the highest group of identification with 
the lowest group of identification while excluding the middle group. With these concerns, 
consumer-company identification was manipulated into two groups of identification (low 
versus high) rather than measuring it within subjects.  
To manipulate consumer-company identification, a product category had to be 
selected that would be highly relevant to the subjects (college students). A list of seven 
product categories was generated by 20 U.S. college students (13 males and 7 females). 
Participants were asked to list products or product categories that were most important 
and relevant to them. The list comprised: digital cameras, computers, cars, cell phones, 
running shoes, televisions, soft drinks (see Table 1).  
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Table 1: Most Relevant Product Categories by College Students 
Product Categories N = 100 (20 subjects x 5 products) 
Digital Cameras 3 
Computers 19 
Cars 5 
Cell Phones 9 
Running Shoes 3 
Televisions 6 
Soft Drinks 3 
 
The results showed that computers were generally perceived as the most 
important and relevant product category. To confirm it, another pretest was conducted. A 
total of 26 college students were asked to answer questions about their involvement in 
and knowledge of each of the seven product categories. According to the descriptive 
analysis, as shown in Table 2, computers appeared to retain the highest product 
involvement (M = 6.82, SD = .590) though only the second highest product knowledge 
(M = 5.73, SD = .962). On the other hand, cell phones retained the highest product 
knowledge (M = 5.99, SD = 1.085) though only the second highest product involvement 
(M = 6.69, SD = .476). As a result, the product category for the study was chosen to be 
computers.  
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Table 2: Product Evaluation  
Categories Dimensions Mean SD 
Digital Cameras 
Involvement 
Knowledge 
5.84 
4.86 
1.282 
1.306 
Computers 
Involvement 
Knowledge 
6.82 
5.73 
.590 
.962 
Cars 
Involvement 
Knowledge 
6.63 
4.99 
.829 
1.220 
Cell Phones 
Involvement 
Knowledge 
6.69 
5.99 
.476 
1.085 
Running Shoes 
Involvement 
Knowledge 
4.97 
4.12 
1.730 
1.832 
Televisions 
Involvement 
Knowledge 
5.51 
5.13 
1.448 
1.225 
Soft Drinks 
Involvement 
Knowledge 
3.04 
4.87 
1.980 
1.754 
 
 As the group from which one company would be selected as being involved in an 
environmental incident, the following four major U.S. computer manufactures were 
selected: Dell, Hewlett-Packard (HP), Apple, and Gateway. To avoid any country-origin 
effect, the study excluded international computer manufacturers (e.g., Sony, Samsung, 
Toshiba, etc.).  
Confirmation of Type of Crisis Communication Strategy 
There were created, for the manipulation of the second factor—crisis 
communication strategy—three versions of a newspaper article; they corresponded to the 
three strategies of interest (excuse, compensation, and apology). The manipulated 
newspaper articles were shown to 46 undergraduate students at a major state university in 
the Southwest. This was to confirm whether the three versions had been appropriately 
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manipulated. Participants were asked to rate their perceptions of the company’s crisis 
communication strategies. The perceptions of crisis communication strategies were 
assessed with three questions, modified from Coombs and Holladay’s (2008) 
manipulation-check items for crisis response strategies. They were: 1) “The company 
(i.e., Dell, HP, Apple, or Gateway) minimized their responsibility by claiming they were 
unable to control the incident,” 2) “The company (i.e., Dell, HP, Apple, or Gateway) 
offered money or other ways of compensation to the victims,” and 3) “The company (i.e., 
Dell, HP, Apple, or Gateway) took full responsibility for the incident and asked for 
forgiveness.” A series of independent sample t-tests were conducted to compare subject’s 
perceptions of each crisis communication strategy (i.e., excuse, compensation, apology), 
as shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5. Subjects exposed to the excuse strategy evaluated it 
significantly differently (p < 0.01) than they did the compensation strategy (p < 0.001). 
They did not, however, evaluate the apology strategy significantly differently (p > .05). 
Similarly, when comparing the excuse and apology strategies, evaluations of the excuse 
strategy (p < .01) differed significantly from those of the apology (p < .001) strategy, 
while those of the compensation strategy did not (p > .05). The last t-test with two 
conditions – compensation and apology strategies – indicated that the evaluations of the 
compensation (p < .01) and apology (p < .001) strategies were significantly different 
between the two conditions, yet evaluations of the excuse strategy was not (p > .05). 
These results indicate that the three crisis communication strategies were successfully 
manipulated.  
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Table 3: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Excuse and Compensation 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Excuse Condition  
(n = 16) 
Compensation Condition  
(n = 17) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 5.00 3.06 3.63 .001 
Compensation 3.12 6.12 -5.65 .000 
Apology 3.59 4.29 -1.12 ns 
 
Table 4: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Excuse and Apology 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Excuse Condition   
(n = 16) 
Apology Condition   
(n = 17) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 5.00 2.92 3.00 .006 
Compensation 3.12 4.31 -1.83 ns 
Apology 3.59 6.38 -5.35 .000 
 
Table 5: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Compensation and Apology 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Compensation Condition 
(n = 16) 
Apology Condition  
(n = 17) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 3.06 2.92 .21 ns 
Compensation 6.12 4.31 3.81 .001 
Apology 4.29 6.38 -4.25 .000 
 
In addition, the believability of the news articles was also measured with a three-
item semantic differential scale anchored by: “not at all believable—completely 
believable,” “not at all plausible—completely plausible,” and “doesn’t make sense at 
all—completely makes sense.” Descriptive analysis indicated the subjects found the 
newspaper articles to be somewhat believable (M = 4.87, SD = 1.614).  
Study Subjects 
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A total of 236 subjects from a major state university in the Southwest were 
recruited to participate in the experiment. The experiment was conducted through the 
Internet. Students were given the opportunity to participate in the experiment as a way of 
receiving either course or extra credit.  
Stimulus Development  
For the first study, three versions of a newspaper article were developed. They 
described negative corporate information about a crisis event and the corporate response 
strategy to the crisis event. The report of an environmental crisis event was fabricated to 
eliminate any potential prior familiarity with or attitude toward an existing crisis event. A 
river getting polluted was selected as the corporate incident; specifically, the company 
was said to be involved in a phenol spill into the Sierra Mac River. Three strategies were 
selected to manipulate the types of crisis communication strategies. To compare a 
diminish strategy with a rebuild strategy and further compare equivalent crisis 
communication strategies, excuse was selected from the diminish cluster and 
compensation and apology from the rebuild cluster. Using the crisis communication 
strategies, three types of corporate response information (excuse vs. compensation vs. 
apology) were developed. The three versions of the news article therefore were identical 
aside from the type of corporate response information. Finally, to manipulate the level of 
consumer-company identification, four major U.S. computer corporate brands (i.e., Dell, 
HP, Apple, and Gateway) were inserted as the offending company. The company that 
was so inserted depended on the who the subject had designated as being the lowest or 
highest identified. In turn, the experiment was designed so as to match the highest/lowest 
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identified company with subjects’ actual preferences. Hence, subjects were given 
negative information about the company with which they were highest/lowest identified. 
This was to increase the external validity of the study.  
Dependent Measures 
How effective the crisis communication strategy was to the crisis event were 
assessed using the following six variables: feelings of betrayal, post-crisis corporate 
reputation, perceived corporate credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative word-
of-mouth intention, and purchase intention.  
Feelings of Betrayal 
 To better understand certain consumer responses toward a corporate crisis, it is 
useful to be familiar with the concept of “feelings of betrayal,” a concept drawn from 
organizational behavior and the literature on retailing. Along with “perceptions,” 
“feelings” precede attitudes or behavior. Feelings are even followed by perceptions. 
However, consumer research in corporate crisis contexts has rather neglected consumer’s 
emotions/feelings compared to the research on perceptions, attitudes, and behavior. 
Feeling betrayed may be a starting point of consumer responses to a crisis, and affect 
other subsequent responses. Thus, the study included feelings of betrayal as one of the 
assessments for the effect of crisis communication strategies. Feelings of betrayal were 
measured with a three-item, Likert-type scale as follows: “After becoming aware of the 
incident described in the news article above, I felt cheated by the company,” “After 
becoming aware of the incident described in the news article above, I felt betrayed by the 
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company,” “After becoming aware of the incident described in the news article above, I 
felt lied to by the company,” (Gregoire & Fisher, 2008). 
Post-Crisis Corporate Reputation 
Most crisis communication research argues that a crisis threatens the reputation of 
a company. One of the primary reasons that a company promptly and appropriately 
responds to a crisis is, therefore, to restore their positive reputation. In the crisis 
communication literature, post-crisis corporate reputation has been used as one of the 
dependent variables measuring the effect of crisis response strategies (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2008; Claeys, Cauberghe, & Vyncke, 2010) 
Post-crisis corporate reputation was assessed based on a five-item version of 
Coombs and Holladay’s (2002) Organizational Reputation Scale. The five-item version 
of the Organizational Reputation Scale consists of the following: “The company is 
concerned with the well-being of its consumers.” “The company is basically dishonest.” 
“I do not trust the company to tell the truth about the incident.” “Under most 
circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the company says.” “The company is not 
concerned with the well-being of its consumers.” Previous studies employing the 
Organizational Reputation Scale produced a reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s alpha) 
higher than .80 (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2008, 2009). 
Perceived Corporate Credibility 
Consumers’ perceptions of a company in a corporate crisis were measured with, 
in addition to post-crisis corporate reputation, corporate credibility. The concept of 
corporate credibility may be perceived by some as being quite similar to post-crisis 
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corporate reputation. Yet it also seems like a subdirectory concept of corporate 
reputation. Furthermore, corporate credibility has frequently been studied while coupled 
with attitudes toward the company in a corporate crisis context (Pashupati, Arpan, & 
Nikolaev, 2002; Kline, Simunich, & Weber, 2009). Consequently, this study includes 
perceived corporate credibility as a useful concept to assess the effectiveness of corporate 
crisis communication strategies. To measure perceived corporate credibility, the study 
used a six-item semantic differential scale, anchored by the adjectives “unbelievable-
believable,” “not credible-credible,” “not trustworthy-trustworthy,” “not dependable-
dependable,” “unreliable-reliable,” and “unreputable-reputable” (Lafferty & Goldsmith, 
1999; MacKenzie & Lutz, 1989)  
Attitudes toward the Company 
A crisis carries with it negative effects for not only consumers’ perceptions of a 
company but also their attitudes toward it (Klein & Dawar, 2004). Marketing literature on 
a brand crisis suggests that crisis response strategies influence consumers’ attitudes 
toward the brand (Dutta & Pullig, 2011). The present study, therefore, includes as one of 
the variables attitudes toward the company, so as to assess the effect of crisis 
communication strategies. Attitudes toward the company were assessed on a five-item, 
semantic differential scale anchored by the adjectives “bad-good,” “unfavorable-
favorable,” “unpleasant-pleasant” “dislike-like,” and “negative-positive” (MacKenzie & 
Lutz, 1989; Till & Busler, 2000).  
Negative Word-of-Mouth Intention 
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A crisis may, in addition to everything noted above, generate a negative impact on 
behavior. Eagly and Chaiken (1993) suggested that intentions refer to a person’s 
motivation, his or her conscious plan to exert effort to carry out a behavior. In this regard, 
intentions are easily differentiated from attitudes. A crisis can anger consumers and 
generate negative word-of-mouth (Coombs & Holladay, 2008, 2009). To manage a crisis, 
it is critical that those in charge minimize the harm inflicted by negative word-of-mouth. 
The present study, based on previous research, assesses negative word-of-mouth intention 
as one of the dependent variables. Negative word-of-mouth intention was measured using 
a three-item, seven-point, Likert-type scale: “I would encourage friends or relatives not to 
buy products from the company;” “I would say negative things about the company and its 
products to other people;” and “I would recommend the company’s products to someone 
who asked my advice” (Coombs & Holladay, 2008). 
Purchase Intention 
Another important concept to measure consumer’s behavior is purchase intention. 
Bagozzi et al. (1979) defined purchase intention as personal action tendencies related to a 
brand. Purchase intention is more specifically defined as an individual’s conscious plan 
to make an effort to purchase a brand (Spears & Singh, 2004). To assess purchase 
intention, the study asked subjects: How likely is it that you consider purchasing a 
product by the company? The study used a three-item scale, “unlikely-likely,” “definitely 
would not-definitely would,” and “probable-improbable” (Till & Busler, 2000).  
Manipulation-Check Measures 
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Finally, the questionnaire includes manipulation-check items to examine the level 
of consumer-company identification, and whether or not the crisis communication 
strategies were successfully manipulated. First, the strength of each participant’s 
identification with a given company was measured with eight items on a Likert-type scale 
borrowed from Einwiller et al. (2006). The items are as follows: “I am somewhat 
associated with the company;” “I have a sense of connection with the company;” “I 
consider myself as belonging to the group of people who are in favor of the company;” 
“Customers of the company are probably similar to me;” “Employees of the company are 
probably similar to me;” “The company shares my values;” “Being a customer of the 
company is part of my sense of who I am;” and “Purchasing company’s product would 
help me express my identity.”  
Next, to assess the effectiveness of how the crisis communication strategies were 
manipulated, the same scales used in the third pretest were used. Ancillary information 
(e.g., subject demographics) was also obtained to provide a means for checking potential 
biases in the responses.  
Main Study Procedure 
Experiments were conducted to test the hypotheses. A 3 (type of a crisis 
communication strategy: excuse vs. compensation vs. apology) x 2 (consumer-company 
identification: low vs. high) between-subject factorial design was employed. Subjects 
were randomly assigned to view negative corporate information about a crisis event and 
their response to the crisis. Participating in the online experiment were a total of 236 
subjects from a major state university in the Southwest. The website greeted participants 
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with an informed consent notice. Subjects were then asked to click the “proceed” button 
if they agreed to participate in the study. Before being exposed to a newspaper article 
which described negative company information and a corporate response to the crisis 
event, subjects were first categorized into high and low identification groups for the 
manipulation of consumer-company identification. For the high (low) identification 
group, subjects were asked to indicate a company, from Dell, HP, Apple, and Gateway, 
that they felt most (least) connected to. Participants were then given a news article 
relating a negative incident involving the company—whichever one they chose. 
Following that, participants filled out a questionnaire. Subjects were asked about their 
feelings of betrayal, perceptions of post-crisis corporate reputation and corporate 
credibility, their attitudes toward the company, their negative word-of-mouth as well as 
purchase intentions. Afterwards, subjects were presented questions meant to gauge the 
crisis communication strategy and their identification with the company. Finally, subjects 
answered demographic questions such as age, gender, years in college, and so forth. 
Before subjects left the online experimental site, they were shown a statement telling that 
the newspaper articles had been entirely fabricated.  
RESULT 
Study 1 delves into consumers’ responses to crisis communication strategies. The 
study primarily examines 1) how consumer-company identification affects the 
effectiveness of an excuse strategy, 2) the moderating role of consumer-company 
identification in the effectiveness of different crisis communication strategies 
(compensation and apology strategies). Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 2 were proposed based 
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on these study objectives. The hypotheses were tested based on a series of 3 (type of a 
crisis communication strategy: excuse vs. compensation vs. apology) x 2 (consumer-
company identification: low vs. high) between-subject ANOVAs. The effectiveness of 
crisis communication strategies was measured through six dependent variables. The six 
were: feelings of betrayal, post-crisis corporate reputation, perceived corporate 
credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative word-of-mouth intention, and 
purchase intention. Procedures and analyses are, in the following sections, presented in 
detail.  
Sample Profile 
A total of 236 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects’ average age 
was 20.3 with more female subjects (62.8%, n = 147) participating than male (37.2%, n = 
87). Over half (54.5%, n = 128) were Caucasian/White, 6.8% (n = 16) African 
American/Black, 22.1% (n = 52) Hispanic/Latino, 12.3% (n = 29) 10% Asian/Asian 
American, 0.9% (n = 2) Pacific Islander, and 3.4% (n = 8) other. The majority of subjects 
were juniors (31.4%, n = 74), followed by sophomores (27.1%, n = 64), freshmen (22%, 
n = 52), seniors (19.1%, n = 45), and graduate students (0.4%, n = 1). Over 98% of the 
subjects (n = 232) reported owning a computer and over 50% (n = 123) reported having a 
computer manufactured by the company described in the given newspaper article.  
Manipulation Checks 
Created for the experiment were three versions of a newspaper article describing a 
computer manufacturer’s involvement in a corporate incident – river pollution – and its 
response to the incident (excuse vs. compensation vs. apology). Manipulation checks 
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were conducted to ensure that subjects perceived crisis communication strategies as 
intended, and consumer-company identification was appropriately manipulated.  
First, to confirm the manipulation of crisis communication strategies (excuse vs. 
compensation vs. apology), a series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to 
compare subjects’ perceptions of each crisis communication strategy (i.e., excuse, 
compensation, apology). As shown in Tables 6, 7, and 8, when comparing the excuse and 
compensation strategies, the evaluations of the excuse (p < 0.01) and compensation 
strategies (p < 0.001) were significantly different between the two conditions. The 
evaluation of the apology strategy, however, was not significantly different (p > .05). 
Similarly, when comparing the excuse and apology strategies, evaluations of the excuse 
strategy (p < .01) differed significantly from those of the apology (p < .001) strategy, 
while those of the compensation strategy did not (p > .05). The last t-test with two 
conditions – compensation and apology strategies – indicated that the evaluations of 
compensation (p < .001) and apology (p < .001) strategies were significantly different 
from one another, while that of the excuse strategy was not (p > .05). These results 
indicate that three crisis communication strategies were successfully manipulated.  
Table 6: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Excuse and Compensation 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Excuse Condition  
(n = 82) 
Compensation Condition  
(n = 71) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 4.73 3.99 3.53 .001 
Compensation 3.68 5.21 -7.14 .000 
Apology 3.49 3.83 -1.55 ns 
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Table 7: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Excuse and Apology 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Excuse Condition   
(n = 82) 
Apology Condition   
(n = 83) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 4.73 3.59 5.49 .000 
Compensation 3.68 3.72 -.174 ns 
Apology 3.49 5.55 -9.90 .000 
 
Table 8: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Compensation and Apology 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Compensation Condition 
(n = 71) 
Apology Condition  
(n = 83) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 3.99 3.59 1.615 ns 
Compensation 5.21 3.72 6.10 .000 
Apology 3.83 5.55 -8.48 .000 
 
In addition, to check for a random assigning to the manipulated conditions, the 
study verified, with independent sample t-tests, gender, ethnicity, and corporate brand 
ownership. The results indicated that gender (p > .05), ethnicity (p > .05), and corporate 
brand ownership (p > .05) were not significantly different among the excuse, 
compensation, and apology strategy conditions. This suggests that subjects were 
randomly assigned to each of the three conditions (excuse, compensation, apology).  
Another independent samples t-test confirmed that the independent variable of 
consumer-company identification was appropriately manipulated as intended. The level 
of identification with the company appeared significantly different between low (M = 
2.83, SD = 1.720) and high consumer company identification groups (M = 4.95, SD = 
1.116); t (207.098) = -11.289, p < .001. The t-tests with gender (p > .05) and ethnicity (p 
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> .05) confirmed a random assigning of the subjects to the low or high identification 
conditions. Since corporate brand ownership is closely related to consumer-company 
identification, it was, as expected, significantly different across the manipulated 
conditions (low vs. high identification). In addition, the news articles were found 
somewhat believable (M = 4.73, SD = 1.09).  
Reliability Tests 
The main study employed several multiple-item scales. The reliability of each 
scale, therefore, was measured within the excuse strategy condition before testing 
Hypothesis 1. Reliability tests demonstrated that all measured variables were above 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient .07 except negative word-of-mouth (α = .69): consumer-
company identification (α = .94), the believability of newspaper article (α = .89), feelings 
of betrayal (α = .95), post-crisis corporate reputation (α = .82), perceived corporate 
credibility (α = .96), attitudes toward the company (α = .98), and purchase intention (α = 
.98). Regarding the reliability of the measured variables, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient 
was between .69 and .98.  
Hypotheses Tests 
To test proposed hypotheses H1 and H2, a series of two-way ANOVAs were 
conducted on each of the dependent variables: feelings of betrayal, post-crisis corporate 
reputation, perceived corporate credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative word-
of-mouth intention, and purchase intention. Results of hypotheses testing are presented in 
the order of the hypotheses. Table 9 provides descriptive statistics of each cell. 
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Table 9: Experimental Design Descriptive Statistics 
Excuse Strategy (n = 82 ) Low Consumer-Company Identification (n = 40) 
High Consumer-Company Identification (n = 42) 
Compensation Strategy (n = 71 ) Low Consumer-Company Identification (n = 40) 
High Consumer-Company Identification (n = 31) 
Apology Strategy (n = 83) Low Consumer-Company Identification (n = 41) 
High Consumer-Company Identification (n = 42) 
 
Testing Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 predicted, within the excuse strategy condition, the main effect of 
the level of identification with a company on feelings of betrayal. That is, it is proposed 
that an excuse strategy leads to a lower level of feelings of betrayal, a higher level of 
post-crisis corporate reputation and corporate credibility, more favorable attitudes toward 
the company, less intention for negative word-of-mouth, and more purchase intention 
among subjects with high identification with the company than those with low 
identification.  
To test H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d, H1e, and H1f, a series of two-way ANOVAs were 
run with the data on each of the dependent variables. Table 10 provides descriptive 
statistics and the 3 x 2 ANOVAs results. The results of ANOVAs found significant main 
effects of consumer-company identification on all of the dependent variables aside from 
feelings of betrayal. First, unexpectedly, the result of ANOVA on feelings of betrayal 
indicated that there was no significant main effect of consumer-company identification (p 
> .05). To confirm the non-significant effect of consumer-company identification within 
the excuse strategy, a one-way ANOVA on feelings of betrayal only with the data in the 
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excuse strategy condition was conducted. The results showed that feelings of betrayal 
were not significantly different between the low and high identifications in the excuse 
condition (p > .05), thus disconfirming H1a.  
Next, a two-way ANOVA on post-crisis corporate reputation showed that 
consumers who were more highly identified with the company generated a higher level of 
post-crisis corporate reputation, F(1, 230) = 6.46, (p < .05). H1b was supported by a 
further one-way ANOVA on post-crisis corporate reputation within the excuse condition 
that confirmed that the excuse strategy led to a higher perception of post-crisis corporate 
reputation among consumers with high identification (M = 4.78, SD = 1.04) than among 
those with low identification (M = 4.18, SD = 1.08), F(1, 80) = 6.45, (p < .05).  
The results of ANOVA on perceived corporate credibility also demonstrated a 
significant main effect of level of consumer-company identification in consumer 
responses toward crisis communication strategies, F(1, 230) = 45.43, (p < .001). H1c was 
supported by a further analysis of the one-way ANOVA on perceived corporate 
credibility within the excuse strategy; subjects in the high identification group (M = 5.21, 
SD = 1.08) were more likely to perceive the company as credible than those in the low 
identification group (M = 4.31, SD = 1.30); F(1, 80) = 11.52, (p < .01). Another ANOVA 
was tested on attitudes toward the company. A significant main effect of consumer-
company identification was found, F(1, 230) = 56.17, (p < .001). Furthermore, based on 
the one-way ANOVA on attitudes toward the company with the data in the excuse 
strategy, when the company used the excuse strategy in responding to the crisis, subjects 
highly identified with the company (M = 5.32, SD = 1.25) were more likely to have 
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favorable attitudes toward the company than those with low identification (M = 4.09, SD 
= 1.54); F(1, 80) = 15.77, (p < .001), providing support for H1d.  
Subsequently, a two-way ANOVA on negative word-of-mouth intention also 
demonstrated that the negative word-of-mouth intention differed significantly in the high 
identification group from the low identification group, F(1, 230) = 33.03, (p < .001). The 
one-way ANOVA conducted within the excuse strategy also confirmed that subjects who 
were more identified with the company (M = 2.86, SD = .963) had less negative-word-of-
mouth intention than those who were less identified with the company (M = 3.82, SD = 
1.32); F(1, 80) = 14.23, (p < .001). This was after they were exposed to the newspaper 
article describing the company’s excuse response to the crisis. H1e was thus supported. 
Lastly, the results of the two-way ANOVA on purchase intention found a significant 
main effect of consumer-company identification, F(1, 230) = 101.117, (p < .001). A one-
way ANOVA on purchase intention, which was performed with the data in the excuse 
strategy condition, also showed the same pattern with the result of two-way ANOVA on 
purchase intention. This showed that high identification with the company (M = 5.36, SD 
= 1.24) generated a higher level of purchase intention than low identification (M = 3.42, 
SD = 2.15); F(1, 80) = 25.45, (p < .001). H1f was, therefore, also confirmed. 
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Table 10: Descriptive Statistics and Results of Two-way ANOVAs  
 Low Identification High Identification 
Dependent Variables 
Excuse 
Compen
-sation 
Apology Excuse 
Compen
-sation 
Apology 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Mean 
(SD) 
Feelings of Betrayal 
3.01 
(1.34) 
3.19 
(1.41) 
3.09 
(1.27) 
2.82 
(1.35) 
3.47 
(1.41) 
2.63 
(1.49) 
Post-Crisis Corporate 
Reputation 
4.18 
(1.08) 
4.49 
(.982) 
4.60 
(.926) 
4.78 
(1.04) 
4.55 
(.941) 
4.97 
(1.16) 
Perceived Corporate 
Credibility 
4.32 
(1.30) 
4.16 
(1.39) 
3.77 
(1.47) 
5.21 
(1.08) 
5.13 
(1.30) 
5.40 
(1.35) 
Attitudes toward the 
Company 
4.09 
(1.54) 
3.88 
(1.54) 
3.69 
(1.70) 
5.32 
(1.25) 
5.10 
(1.42) 
5.57 
(1.34) 
Negative Word-of-Mouth 
Intention 
3.82 
(1.32) 
4.05 
(1.21) 
4.24 
(1.40) 
2.86 
(.963) 
3.47 
(1.23) 
2.99 
(1.23) 
Purchase Intention 
3.42 
(2.15) 
2.74 
(1.92) 
2.92 
(1.78) 
5.36 
(1.24) 
4.95 
(1.53) 
5.54 
(1.50) 
Dependent Variables Source F P 
Feelings of Betrayal
a 
Type of Strategy (A) 2.59 .077 
Level of Identification (B) .452 .502 
A x B 1.37 .256 
Post-Crisis Corporate 
Reputation
b
 
A 2.08 .127 
B 6.49 .011 
A x B 1.26 .285 
Perceived Corporate 
Credibility
c
 
A .390 .677 
B 45.43 .000 
AxB 1.93 .147 
Attitudes toward the 
Company
d
 
A .424 .655 
B 56.17 .000 
AxB 1.34 .264 
Negative Word-of-Mouth 
Intention
e 
 
A 2.36 .097 
B 33.03 .000 
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Table 10: Cont. 
 
   
 AxB 1.39 .251 
Purchase Intention
f
 
A 1.97 .142 
B 101.12 .000 
AxB .826 .439 
Notes: ANOVA = analysis of variance. 
a
R
2 
= .035 (Adjusted R
2
 = .014) 
b
R
2 
= .056 (Adjusted R
2
 = .036) 
c
R
2 
= .183 (Adjusted R
2
 = .165) 
d
R
2 
= .212 (Adjusted R
2
 = .195) 
e
R
2 
= .158 (Adjusted R
2
 = .140) 
f
R
2 
= .325 (Adjusted R
2
 = .310) 
 
Testing Hypothesis 2 
Next, Hypothesis 2 examined the interaction effects between type of a crisis 
communication strategy and level of consumer-company identification on the six 
dependent variables – feelings of betrayal, post-crisis corporate reputation, perceived 
corporate credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative word-of-mouth intention, 
and purchase intention - within the compensation and apology conditions. More 
specifically, Hypothesis 2 predicted that for subjects who strongly identified with the 
company, the compensation strategy would be as effective as the apology strategy. For 
those weakly identified with the company, the apology strategy is more effective than the 
compensation strategy, yielding a lower level of feeling betrayed, a higher level of post-
crisis corporate reputation and corporate credibility, more favorable attitudes toward the 
company, a lower level of negative word-of-mouth intention, and a higher level of 
purchase intention.  
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Results of each of the two-way ANOVA tests presented in Table 7 above showed 
that H2a, H2b, H2c, H2d, H2e, and H2f were not supported. None of the ANOVA tests 
found significant interaction effects between the two factors. That is, the effect of type of 
a crisis communication strategy (i.e., compensation, apology) was not dependent upon 
the level of consumer-company identification.  
First, the result of the two-way ANOVA on feelings of betrayal did not show a 
significant interaction between type of a crisis communication strategy and level of 
consumer-company identification. This suggested that level of consumer-company 
identification (p > .05) influenced the effects of the compensation and apology strategies 
on feelings of betrayal. Thus, H2a was not supported. The result of the ANOVA on post-
crisis corporate reputation indicated that the effects of the compensation and apology 
strategies were not significantly different on the dependent variable regardless of the 
level of consumer-company identification, thus disconfirming H2b (p > .05).  
The ANOVA on perceived corporate credibility also showed no significant 
interaction effect between the type of a crisis communication strategy and the level of 
consumer-company identification; both compensation and apology strategies generated 
similar levels of corporate credibility in both conditions of high and low identification. 
H2c, thus, was not supported (p > .05). Next, to test H2d an ANOVA was conducted on 
attitudes toward the company. The result demonstrated that, as with the same pattern 
found with the previous tests, the level of consumer-company identification failed to 
influence the effects of crisis communication strategies; the effects of compensation and 
apology strategies on attitudes toward the company were not significantly different across 
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the conditions of high and low identification, disconfirming H2d (p > .05). H2e was 
tested in the same way. No significant interaction was found between the two the factors, 
suggesting that H2e was not supported (p > .05). Both of the compensation and apology 
strategies led to similar levels of negative word-of-mouth intention regardless of the level 
of identification with the company. Lastly, the result of the ANOVA on purchase 
intention showed the same pattern with the aforementioned results. For both conditions of 
high and low identification, the compensation and apology strategies generated similar 
levels of purchase intention, failing to support H2f (p > .05). 
In addition, interestingly, the results of the two-way ANOVAs on the six 
dependent variables failed to show the main effect of type of a crisis communication 
strategy. Even though the main effect of type of a crisis communication strategy was not 
hypothesized for the study, one of the premises of the study was that the more 
accommodating strategy (i.e., apology strategy), the more effective. The following 
section discusses this unexpected finding along with the results of hypotheses testing. 
The summary of hypotheses tests is listed in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
Hypotheses Results 
H1a: Feelings of Betrayal HI
a
 < LI
b Not 
Supported 
H1b: Post-Crisis Corporate Reputation HI > LI 
Supported 
H1c: Perceived Corporate Credibility HI > LI 
H1d: Attitudes toward the Company HI > LI 
H1e: Negative Word-of-Mouth Intention HI < LI 
H1f: Purchase Intention HI > LI 
H1a: Feelings of Betrayal 
HI: Compensation = Apology 
LI: Compensation > Apology 
Not 
supported 
H1b: Post-Crisis Corporate Reputation 
HI: Compensation = Apology 
LI: Compensation < Apology 
H1c: Perceived Corporate Credibility 
HI: Compensation = Apology 
LI: Compensation < Apology 
H1d: Attitudes toward the Company 
HI: Compensation = Apology 
LI: Compensation < Apology 
H1e: Negative Word-of-Mouth Intention 
HI: Compensation = Apology 
LI: Compensation > Apology 
H1f: Purchase Intention 
HI: Compensation = Apology 
LI: Compensation < Apology 
a
 = High Identification, 
b
 = Low Identification 
DISCUSSION 
The results of Study 1 lend support to the notion that the level of consumer’s 
identification with a company influences the effectiveness of crisis communication 
strategies. Regardless the type of a crisis communication strategy (excuse, compensation, 
or apology), the results indicate that consumers who strongly identify with the company 
are more likely to respond favorably toward the corporate incident and the corporation’s 
response to the crisis. More specifically, consumers with high identification with the 
company are more likely to perceive the company as reputable and credible, to have more 
favorable attitudes toward the company, and to be willing to buy products from the 
company in the future than those with low identification with the company. Moreover, 
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they are less likely to spread negative information about the company and its products 
after being exposed to the corporate crisis. Consistent with previous studies in the 
interpersonal communication (Finkel et al., 2002; Karrenmans and Aarts, 2007), the 
findings suggest that consumers who are highly identified with and who feel connected to 
the company are more likely to adopt a generous toward the company’s involvement in a 
negative incident. In other words, the close relationship between a consumer and a 
company in a non-crisis situation acts as an immunization to a corporate crisis.  
As predicted in Hypothesis 1, it should be noted that an excuse strategy is more 
effective for consumers strongly identified with a company than for those weakly 
identified. This finding further rationalizes the argument that the information processing 
of a corporate incident may vary depending on a consumer’s identification with the 
company (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2003; Einwiller et al., 2006). Consumers who strongly 
identified with a company would seem to process the negative information in defensive 
information processing to protect their self-belief and resist attitude change that negative 
corporate information could potentially bring about. Accordingly, a consumer would be 
less likely to attribute the crisis to the company and more likely, in resolving cognitive 
dissonance caused by the crisis, to seek other attributes attending the crisis. Thus, for 
consumers feeling a close connection to the company, the excuse communication strategy 
can be viewed as a valid defense of the company’s position.  
Consumers feeling little or no connection with the company would be likely to 
process the negative corporate information more diagnostically, trying to figure out the 
truth behind the crisis. Such consumers are more likely to attribute the negative incident 
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to the company and expect it to take greater responsibility. Therefore, these consumers 
are likely to see excuses as the company’s evasion technique of taking responsibility.  
It should also be noted that consumer-company identification had no effect on a 
consumer’s feeling of betrayal. The mean of feelings of betrayal in both groups of high 
and low identification was less than four. This indicates that regardless of their level of 
identification with a company, subjects may not feel betrayed by the manipulated crisis. 
This may mean that the severity of the crisis used in this experiment failed to rise to a 
high enough level to evoke a feeling of betrayal. This finding may be a result of the 
manipulation-related problems. Participants may regard the crisis of river pollution 
described in the newspaper article as an accidental weather-related crisis. Company 
blame for the crisis might have thus been mitigated. Different results may be found when 
using a transgression crisis. Or the result may also, perhaps, be explained by  the 
participants’ low involvement in the crisis described in the newspaper articles. River 
pollution occurring away from the participants’ living boundary might have lowered their 
crisis involvement. Had the crisis happened in their towns, their feelings of betrayal 
would surely have increased. Accordingly, the level of betrayed feelings might be much 
affected by the degree of consumer-company identification. This speculation implies that 
in the research of feelings of betrayal in corporate crisis contexts personal involvement in 
the crisis or social distance between a consumer and a crisis are pivotal constructs that 
should be considered in future studies.  
Another possible explanation for the failure to show the non-significant effect of 
the consumer-company identification on the feelings of betrayal arises from the 
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measurement of the feeling of betrayal. The measurement used in this study might fail to 
adequately tap into construct of the feelings of betrayal. A more refined and sophisticated 
measure may produce the expected results.  
The use of a river pollution crisis may also explain the absence of the main effect 
of type of a crisis communication strategy. Surprisingly, the study found that all 
strategies—excuse, compensation, and apology—generated similar consumer responses 
toward a corporate crisis and crisis communication strategies. This finding was 
unexpected. It had been assumed, based on the literature (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; 
Dean, 2004; Lyon & Cameron, 2004), that the more accommodative strategy (apology) 
would be the more effective. As mentioned above, since the crisis type used in the 
experiment – river pollution – could be considered as an accidental crisis to some extent, 
an excuse strategy may not be taken as offensive. In fact, it could be perceived as 
appropriate, yielding the similar effectiveness with more accommodative strategies such 
as compensation and apology strategies. This finding calls for another study using a 
different type of crisis (e.g., transgression crisis).  
In addition, consumer-company identification failed to significantly moderate the 
effect of type of a crisis communication strategy. This did not square with the prediction 
that compensation and apology strategies would be similarly effective for consumers with 
high identification and that for those with low identification an apology strategy would be 
the more effective. In fact, the effects of the two crisis communication strategies were 
found to be the same regardless the level of consumer-company identification.  
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In short, this study’s findings suggest that the three crisis communication 
strategies – excuse, compensation, and apology – have equivalent effects. They generated 
similar levels of feelings of betrayal, post-crisis corporate reputation, corporate 
credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative word-of-mouth intention, and 
purchase intention. The study further suggests that the equivalent effectiveness is not 
dependent upon consumer’s level of identification with a company. A compensation 
strategy or even an excuse strategy can be as effective as an apology strategy regardless 
of the level of consumer-company identification. To verity this finding, a different type 
of crisis (e.g., transgression crisis) should be dealt with in this context. Adding crisis type 
as another moderating factor to alter the effectiveness of crisis communication strategies 
may explain this unexpected finding and strengthen the study’s external validity. If so, it 
would expand our understanding of consumer responses under a corporate crisis in 
reality.  
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CHAPTER V:  STUDY 2 
Study 2 investigates the moderating effect of perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type on the effect of crisis communication strategies (Hypotheses 
3 and 4). This chapter gives an overview of Study 2’s design, its major constructs and 
measurements, the data collection procedure, the sampling, and results. A brief 
discussion is also included. 
METHOD 
Experimental Design 
To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, a 2 x 2 between-subject factorial design was 
employed. The two factors were types of crisis communication strategies (excuse vs. 
apology) and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type (incongruent vs. 
congruent). Both factors were manipulated variables. Types of crisis communication 
strategy were devised to manipulate the excuse or apology strategies. The perceived fit 
between corporate associations and crisis type was devised to manipulate incongruence 
and congruence.  
Choice of Company with Corporate Ability and Crisis 
Since a consumer-company identification effect was found in Study 1, that factor 
was included in Study 2 as a covariate. Therefore, as with Study 1, a real company with 
CA associations was used for experimental stimuli despite the potential confounding 
effects of pre-existing attitudes and knowledge. The first pretest was conducted to 
develop lists of companies with CA or CSR associations. In reality, most companies have 
multiple associations, that is, both CA and CSR associations. Hence, it was important to 
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select a company thought to have more CA associations and fewer CSR associations. To 
accomplish this, 20 college students (13 males, 7 females) were asked to list three 
companies they thought were experts in their fields, that were reliable, and that 
consistently produced and delivered quality products or services. They were also asked to 
list three companies they thought were foremost at being socially responsible, behaving 
ethically, and contributing to the welfare of society. Table 12 presents companies in order 
of their CA or CSR associations. Companies receiving only one mention were excluded. 
Such companies as Apple, Microsoft, and Adobe were considered to have CA 
associations. Google joined Apple and Microsoft—replacing Adobe—as a company 
having CSR associations. Although Apple had both CA and CSR associations, more than 
50 percent of the subjects perceived it as a company having CA associations. Microsoft 
received the second most mentions as a company with CA associations; however, it was 
perceived as being almost equally social responsible. Apple, therefore, was used as the 
company for the experimental stimulus.  
Table 12: Companies with CA or CSR associations 
Companies with CA 
# of Mention  
(N = 20) 
Companies with CSR 
# of Mention  
(N = 20) 
Apple 11 Apple 6 
Microsoft 7 Microsoft 6 
Adobe 5 Google 6 
Google 4 Facebook 3 
Nike 4 Toms 3 
Amazon 3 Amazon 2 
Sony 3 Whole Food 2 
  Epic 2 
  Bungie 2 
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For the corporate crisis, the study fabricated two types of crisis events – a product 
failure and an ethical violation. The product failure was used to satisfy the conditions of a 
good fit between corporate associations (CA) and crisis type. The ethical violation was 
used to satisfy those of a bad fit between corporate associations (CA) and crisis type. To 
minimize the difference of crisis attribution to the company, both crises were 
manipulated as the same crisis type – a transgression crisis involving an organizational 
misdeed. As suggested in the section of discussion of Study 1, a transgression crisis was 
employed for Study 2. The product failure involved allegations that Apple manufactured 
flawed batteries that caused fire injury and damage to its consumer. The unethical 
behavior involved allegations that Apple violated child labor laws in its factories in 
China. 
Experimental Stimulus 
The study developed newspaper articles that exposed negative corporate 
information and the corporate response to the crisis. To satisfy the conditions of 
congruence between corporate associations (CA) and crisis type, the newspaper articles 
described an Apple iPad2 catching fire while being used by its owner. The cause was 
attributed to the device’s lithium ion battery. To satisfy the conditions of incongruence, 
the newspaper articles described Apple factories in China getting caught using child 
labor. The newspaper articles also laid out Apple’s response to the crisis, depicting it as 
either an excuse or apology strategy. Thus, a total of four versions of the newspaper 
article were developed. 
Confirmation of Manipulation 
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The second pretest was conducted to confirm whether or not experimental stimuli 
were properly manipulated as intended. First, the manipulated newspaper articles were 
shown to 31 undergraduate students. Participants were then asked to rate their 
perceptions of crisis communication strategies. This was to confirm whether the two 
types of corporate response were appropriately manipulated based on the type of crisis 
communication strategy (excuse vs. apology). The perceptions of crisis communication 
strategies were assessed using two questions modified from Coombs and Holladay’s 
(2008) manipulation-check items for crisis response strategies: 1) “Apple minimized their 
responsibility by claiming they were unable to control the incident,” and 2) “Apple took 
full responsibility for the incident and asked for forgiveness.”  
An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare subject’s perceptions of 
each crisis communication strategy (i.e., excuse, apology), as shown in Table 13. 
Subjects exposed to the excuse strategy evaluated it significantly differently (p < 0.01) 
than did those exposed to the apology strategy (p < 0.001). This result indicates that two 
different crisis communication strategies were successfully manipulated.  
Table 13: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Excuse and Apology 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Excuse Condition  
(n = 14) 
Apology Condition    
(n = 17) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 4.71 2.82 3.44 .002 
Apology 2.57 5.76 -5.25 .000 
 
The pretest also determined whether Apple was perceived as a company having 
CA associations. Participants were asked to evaluate Apple on each of the corporate 
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attributes: “I think Apple develops innovative products and services;” “I think that Apple 
offers high-quality products;” “I think that Apple offers products that are good value for 
the price;” “I think that Apple is well managed;” and “I think that Apple employs talented 
people in comparison with its competitors”. Apple’s CRS associations were also 
measured and compared with its CA associations using the following three items: “I think 
that Apple supports good causes;” “I think that Apple behaves responsibly regarding the 
environment;” and “I think that Apple is highly involved in the local community,” Both 
measures for CA and CSR associations were adopted from a previous study (Berens, 
Riel, & Bruggen, 2005). A descriptive analysis confirmed that Apple is more likely to 
hold CA associations (M = 5.59, SD = .939) than CSR associations (M = 4.27, SD = 
1.203). 
Finally, the pretest determined whether the congruence between corporate 
associations and crisis type had been successfully manipulated. The perceived fit between 
perceptions of the company and the crisis described in the news article was measured on 
a three-item, seven-point Likert-type scale: “I think that the issue of product defects/child 
labor in general is related to Apple’s expertise in producing and delivering its products 
and services;” “I think that the issue of product defects/child labor in general is relevant 
to Apple’s expertise in producing and delivering its products and services;” and “I think 
that the issue of product defects/child labor in general tells something about Apple’s 
expertise in producing and delivering its products and services.” An independent samples 
t-test confirmed that the independent variable of perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type had been appropriately manipulated. The battery explosion 
81 
incident produced a higher congruence score (M = 5.21, SD = 1.222) between corporate 
associations and crisis type than did the child labor practice (M = 3.89, SD = 1.239); t 
(29) = 2.98, p < .01. 
Lastly, the study measured the believability of the news articles using a three-item, 
semantic differential scale anchored by “not at all believable-completely believable,” 
“not at all plausible-completely plausible,” and “doesn’t make sense at all-completely 
makes sense.” Descriptive analysis indicated the subjects found the newspaper articles to 
be somewhat believable (M = 4.67, SD = 1.253).  
Study Subjects 
Participating in the experiment were a total of 216 undergraduate students in a 
major state university in the Southwest. The experimental sessions were administered 
online. Students were given the opportunity to participate in the experiment as a way of 
receiving course or extra credit.  
Dependent Measures 
The dependent variables were the same as those used in Study 1. The study 
needed to identify the interaction effect of type of crisis communication strategy with 
perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type. To do so, it sought access to 
feelings of betrayal, post-crisis corporate reputation, perceived corporate credibility, 
attitudes toward the company, negative word-of-mouth intention, and purchase intention. 
Also included, as covariates, in the study were the perceived severity of a crisis and 
consumer-company identification. The perceived severity of a crisis controls the different 
perceptions of its seriousness that stem from its type – a product failure or unethical 
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behavior. To assess this variable, subjects were asked to indicate their opinion about the 
following statement: I think that the incident caused consumers, “minor problems – major 
problems,” “small inconveniences – big conveniences,” and “minor aggravation – major 
aggravation” (Gregoire & Fisher, 2008). Furthermore, Study 1 showed the effect of 
consumer-company identification on the dependent variables. Specifically, it was found 
that the level of consumer’s identification with a company significantly affected their 
perceptions of corporate reputation and credibility, attitudes toward the corporation, 
negative word-of-mouth intention, and purchase intention when a company faces a 
negative incident. Because of this finding, Study 2 included the degree of consumer-
company identification as a covariate to control subject’s level of identification with 
Apple. Measures for all of the dependent variables and the control variable of consumer-
company identification were identical to those used in Study 1. The questionnaire also 
included manipulation-check items to see whether the study successfully manipulated the 
crisis communication strategies (independent variable) and the perceived fit between 
corporate associations and crisis type (moderating variable). The same scales used in the 
pretest were used in assessing the effectiveness of the manipulation. Ancillary 
information, such as subject demographic characteristics, was also obtained to provide a 
means for checking potential biases in responses.  
Main Study Procedure 
Data were gathered using a 2 (crisis communication strategies: excuse vs. 
apology) x 2(perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type: congruent vs. 
incongruent) between-subject factorial design. Subjects were randomly assigned to view 
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negative company information involving a crisis event and the company’s response to it. 
A total of 216 subjects participated in the online experiment. The website greeted 
participants with an informed consent notice. Subjects were asked to click the “proceed” 
button if they gave their consent. Subjects then read the newspaper article relating 
Apple’s negative incident and the company’s response to the event. Then, subjects were 
asked to complete questions about their feeling of betrayal, perceptions of post-crisis 
corporate reputation and corporate credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative 
word-of-mouth intention, and purchase intention. Afterwards, subjects were presented 
questions measuring the following: their perception of the crisis severity, their 
identification with the company, their perception of the crisis communication strategy, 
their evaluation of Apple’s corporate associations (CA and CSR), their perception of 
congruence between corporate associations (CA) and crisis type. Finally, subjects 
answered demographic questions such as age, gender, years in college, and so forth. 
Before subjects left the online experimental site, they were shown a statement saying that 
the newspaper articles had been entirely fabricated.  
RESULT 
Study 2 examines the moderating role of perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type in the effectiveness of different crisis communication 
strategies (excuse and apology strategies). Thus, Hypotheses 3 and 4 were proposed 
based on this study objective. Hypotheses 3 and 4 were tested based on a 2 (type of a 
crisis communication strategy: excuse vs. apology) x 2 (perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type: congruent vs. incongruent) using two-way ANCOVAs. Like 
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Study 1, Study 2 employed six dependent variables (feelings of betrayal, post-crisis 
corporate reputation, perceived corporate credibility, attitudes toward the company, 
negative word-of-mouth intention, and purchase intention) to measure the effectiveness 
of crisis communication strategies. As covariates in the analyses, Study 2 included the 
perceived severity of a crisis and the level of consumer-company identification. 
Procedures and analyses are presented in detail in the following sections.  
Sample Profile 
 A total of 216 subjects participated in the main study. After removing subjects who 
failed to complete the survey, a total of 197 subjects remained for further analysis. Of the 197 
subjects, 39% (n = 76) were male and 61% (n = 119) were female. Their mean age was 20.3 
years old. The group consisted of freshmen (24.6%, n = 48), sophomore (26.7%, n = 52), 
juniors (23.6%, n = 46), and seniors (24.6%, n = 48) and a graduate student (0.5%, n = 1). 
The majority of subjects were Caucasian/White (54.1%, n = 105), followed by Asian 
Americans/Asian (24.2%, n = 47), Hispanics/Latino (14.4%, n = 28), others (3.6%, n = 7), 
African Americans/Black (2.6%, n = 5), Native American (0.5%, n = 1), and Pacific Islander 
(0.5%, n = 1). In addition, out of 197 subjects, 92.3% (n = 180) owned an Apple product, 
and 19% (n = 37) owned iPads. Table 9 provides sample demographic characteristics and 
product ownership.  
Manipulation Checks 
Four versions of newspaper articles describing Apple’s involvement in a 
corporate incident (battery explosion vs. child labor practice) and its response to the 
incident (excuse vs. apology) were created for the main study. Manipulation checks were 
85 
conducted to ensure that subjects had correctly perceived type of a crisis communication 
strategy and correctly perceived the fit between Apple’s corporate associations (CA) and 
crisis type as intended. In addition, perceptions of Apple’s corporate associations (CA 
and CSR) were also included in the data analyses for the manipulation checks.  
First, to confirm the manipulation of the type of crisis communication strategy 
(excuse vs. apology), independent sample t-tests were conducted. The results, as shown 
in Table 14, confirmed that two crisis communication strategies were successfully 
manipulated. Subjects exposed to the newspaper article describing an excuse strategy 
were compared with subjects exposed to one describing an apology strategy. The 
comparison revealed that the evaluation of excuse strategy (p < 0.001) differed 
significantly from the evaluation of apology strategy (p < 0.001).  
In addition, independent sample t-tests with gender, ethnicity, and corporate brand 
ownership confirmed that subjects were randomly assigned to the manipulated conditions. 
The results indicated that gender (p > .05), ethnicity (p > .05), and corporate brand 
ownership (p > .05) were not significantly different between the excuse and the apology 
strategy conditions.  
Table 14: Evaluation of Crisis Communication Strategies by Excuse and Apology 
Conditions 
 
Evaluation 
Excuse Condition     
(n = 93) 
Apology Condition 
(n = 102) 
t P-Value 
Excuse 4.47 3.62 4.06 .002 
Apology 3.14 4.98 -9.43 .000 
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Another independent sample t-test showed that the perceived fit between 
corporate associations and crisis type were successfully manipulated. A battery explosion 
was more likely to be perceived as congruent with Apple’s CA associations (M = 4.49, 
SD = .903) than was child labor practice (M = 3.71, SD = 1.200); t (184) = 5.18, p < .001. 
Random assignment in terms of subjects’ gender (p > .05), ethnicity (p > .05), and 
corporate brand ownership (p > .05) were also confirmed with independent sample t-tests. 
Descriptive analyses confirmed that Apple was more likely to be perceived as a 
company holding CA associations (M = 5.52, SD = .974) than CSR associations (M = 
4.56, SD = 1.212). Test results further showed that subjects found the news articles to be 
somewhat believable (M = 4.69, SD = 1.230). 
Reliability Tests 
Reliability tests showed that all measured variables were reliable: perceived fit 
between corporate associations and crisis type (α = .87), CA associations (α = .87), CSR 
associations (α = .89), the believability of newspaper article (α = .92), perceive severity 
of a crisis (α = .88), consumer-company identification (α = .88), feelings of betrayal (α = 
.95), post-crisis corporate reputation (α = .85), perceived corporate responsibility (α = 
.96), attitudes toward the company (α = .98), negative word-of-mouth intention (α = .73), 
and purchase intention (α = .97). Regarding the reliability of the measured variables, the 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was between .73 and .98. 
Hypotheses Tests 
Subsequently, H3 and H4 were tested with a series of two-way ANCOVAs on 
each of the dependent variables – feelings of betrayal, post-crisis corporate reputation, 
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perceived corporate credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative word-of-mouth 
intention, and purchase intention. The effects of perceived severity of a crisis and the 
level of consumer-company identification were controlled for. Study 1 found that the 
level of consumer-company identification had a significant effect on the dependent 
variables. Thus, to test the hypotheses, consumer-company identification was included as 
a covariate in the analyses of Study 2. Results of hypotheses testing are presented below 
in the order of dependent variables. Table 15, which follows, provides descriptive 
statistics of each cell. 
Table 15: 2 x 2 Experimental Design Descriptive Statistics 
Excuse Strategy (n = 93 ) 
Congruence between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type (n = 46) 
Incongruence between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type (n = 47) 
Apology Strategy (n = 102 ) 
Congruence between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type (n = 49) 
Incongruence between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type (n = 53) 
 
Feelings of Betrayal 
Hypotheses 3a and 4a proposed that consumer feelings of betrayal would be 
impacted by an interaction effect from among the type of a crisis communication strategy 
and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type. To conduct an 
ANCOVA on feelings of betrayal, the homogeneity-of-regression assumption was first 
tested. To test for equality of regression slopes, an ANOVA was run with a model that 
included all main effects of the factors, the covariates, and the interaction of the 
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covariates with the factors. No significant interactions were found between type of a 
crisis communication strategy and perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = 1.07, p > .05 
Neither were any found between type of a crisis communication strategy and consumer-
company identification, F(1, 188) = .008, p > .05, nor between perceived fit and 
perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = .465, p > .05, nor between perceived fit and 
consumer-company identification, F(1, 188) = 1.29, p > .05. The non-significant 
interaction effects indicate the regression slopes and regression plane are homogeneous. 
The assumption, therefore, was not violated. 
A two-way ANCOVA was carried out on feelings of betrayal following the test 
for the homogeneity-of-regression assumption. As shown in Table 16, a marginally 
significant interaction effect between type of crisis communication strategy and perceived 
fit was found, F(1, 191) = 3.61, p = .059. More specifically, as presented in Figure 1, 
with Apple being involved in the battery explosion (congruence between corporate 
associations and crisis type), both of the excuse and apology strategies generated lower 
levels of feelings of betrayal than when it was involved in the child labor practices. H4a 
was thus not confirmed. On the other hand, a one-way ANOVA contrast test was further 
performed to test H3a. The result of the analysis showed that the mean between the two 
groups of apology-congruence and apology-incongruence was marginally significant, 
t(193) = -1.81, p = .072, finally suggesting that H3a was marginally supported. 
Interestingly, Figure 1 further indicates that, on feelings of betrayal, the apology strategy 
was more effective than the excuse strategy when the crisis was congruent with corporate 
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associations; the excuse strategy was more effective than the apology when the fit was 
incongruent.  
In addition, the results revealed that while type of a crisis communication strategy 
(p > .05) did not influence consumer feelings of betrayal, perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type had a significant effect, F(1, 191) = 5.36, p < .05. An 
additional note is that the covariate, perceived severity of a crisis appeared to 
significantly influence feelings of betrayal (p < .001). The interaction effect of type of 
crisis communication strategy and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis 
type was still marginally significant despite the significant effect of the covariate. 
Table 16: Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results on Feelings of Betrayal 
 Excuse Apology 
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Feelings of Betrayal 3.28 (1.38) 3.08 (1.42) 2.96 (1.49) 3.46 (1.33) 
Source F P 
Type of Crisis Communication Strategy .587 .445 
Perceived Fit 5.36 .022 
Type of Crisis Communication Strategy x Perceived Fit 3.61 .059 
Perceived Severity of Crisis 29.23 .000 
Consumer-Company Identification 1.39 .240 
Notes: ANCOVA = analysis of covariance. 
R
2 
= .154 (Adjusted R
2
 = .132) 
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Figure 1: Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy x Perceived Fit between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type on Feelings of Betrayal 
 
Post-Crisis Corporate Reputation 
Hypotheses 3b and 4b predicted that consumer perception of post-crisis corporate 
reputation would be impacted by an interaction effect of type of crisis communication 
strategy and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type. H3b and H4b 
were tested with a two-way ANCOVA on post-crisis corporate reputation following the 
test for homogeneity-of-regression assumption. No significant interactions were found 
between type of crisis communication strategy and perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) 
= 3.86, p > .05 Neither were they found between type of a crisis communication strategy 
and consumer-company identification, F(1, 188) = 3.72, p > .05, nor between perceived 
fit and perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = 2.21, p > .05, nor between perceived fit 
and consumer-company identification, F(1, 188) = 2.44, p > .05.  
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A two-way ANCOVA was thus conducted on post-crisis corporate reputation 
with perceived severity of a crisis (p > .05) and consumer-company identification (p 
< .001). Consistent with the prediction, as shown in Table 17, the effects of the excuse 
and apology strategies on post-crisis corporate reputation were dependent on perceived 
fit, F(1, 191) = 7.60, p < .01. Figure 2 presents the pattern of the interaction effect 
between the two factors. In the congruent condition, the apology strategy generated a 
higher level of post-crisis corporate reputation than it did in the incongruent condition. 
On the other hand, the excuse strategy led, in the incongruent condition, to a higher level 
of post-crisis corporate reputation than it did in the congruent condition. As such, the 
interaction pattern looked as though it supported both hypotheses, H3b and H4b. Contract 
tests were then run to confirm the significance of mean differences between groups of 
apology-congruence and apology-incongruence as well as between groups of excuse-
congruence and excuse-incongruence. According to the results, the significant effect of 
the degree of congruence was found in the apology conditions, t(193) = -2.94, p < .01. It 
was not found in the excuse conditions, t(193) = -1.40, p > .05. Therefore, H3b was 
supported while H4b was not.. Figure 2 further indicates that when the fit between 
corporate associations and crisis type was congruent the apology strategy was more 
effective than the excuse strategy on post-crisis corporate reputation. However, when the 
fit is incongruent, the excuse strategy was the more effective. In addition, the results 
found no significant effects on post-crisis corporate reputation by type of a crisis 
communication strategy (p > .05) or by perceived fit between corporate associations and 
crisis type (p > .05).  
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Table 17: Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results on Post-Crisis Corporate 
Reputation 
 
 Excuse Apology 
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Post-Crisis Corporate 
Reputation 
4.55 (1.16) 4.86 (1.28) 5.19 (.961) 4.57 (.897) 
Source F P 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy 1.95 .164 
Perceived Fit 2.42 .122 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy x Perceived Fit 7.60 .006 
Perceived Severity of a Crisis 3.86 .051 
Consumer-Company Identification 54.43 .000 
Notes: ANCOVA = analysis of covariance. 
R
2 
= .276 (Adjusted R
2
 = .257) 
 
Figure 2: Crisis Communication Strategies x Perceived Fit between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type on Post-Crisis Corporate Reputation 
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Perceived Corporate Credibility 
Next, Hypotheses 3c and 4c examined the effect on perceived corporate 
credibility caused by interaction between type of crisis communication strategy and 
perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type. The assumption test for 
equality of regression slopes showed no significant interactions between the independent 
variables and the covariates. No significant interactions were found between type of a 
crisis communication strategy and perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = .175, p > .05. 
Neither were any found between type of crisis communication strategy and consumer-
company identification, F(1, 188) = .022, p > .05, nor between perceived fit and 
perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = 1.47, p > .05, nor between perceived fit and 
consumer-company identification, F(1, 188) = .227, p > .05. The non-significant 
interaction effects indicate that the assumption was not violated. 
A two-way ANCOVA was thus conducted on perceived corporate credibility. A 
significant interaction effect was found on perceived corporate credibility while 
controlling for perceived severity of crisis (p < .001) and consumer-company 
identification (p < .001). The interaction was between type of crisis communication 
strategy and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type, F(1,191) = 4.74, 
p < .05 (see Table 18). In addition, Figure 3 specifically indicates that an apology strategy 
generated a higher level of corporate credibility for subjects in the congruent condition 
(battery explosion) than it did for those in the incongruent condition (child labor 
practices). In contrast, an excuse strategy led to a higher level of corporate credibility for 
subjects in the incongruent condition (child labor practices) than it did for those in the 
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congruent condition (battery explosion). However, to check whether the mean differences 
were statistically significant, additional contrast tests were conducted. The results 
indicated that while the mean was significantly different between the apology-congruence 
and the apology-incongruence conditions, t(193) = 2.20, p < .05, thus supporting H3c, the 
mean difference between the excuse-congruence and the excuse-incongruence conditions 
was not significant, t(193) = -1.19, p > .05, disconfirming H4c. Similar to the same 
pattern with the test on post-crisis corporate reputation, Figure 3 further suggests that 
when a company is involved in a crisis congruent with its corporate associations, an 
apology strategy is more effective than an excuse strategy. When a company is involved 
in a crisis incongruent with its corporate associations, then an excuse strategy works 
better than an apology strategy.  
Furthermore, it should be noted that the interaction effect of the two factors was 
robust despite the significant effects of the covariates – perceived severity of a crisis and 
consumer-company identification. The results also revealed that no significant main 
effects of crisis communication strategies (p > .05) and perceived fit between corporate 
associations and crisis type (p > .05) were found on perceived corporate credibility.  
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results on Perceived Corporate 
Credibility 
 Excuse Apology 
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Perceived Corporate 
Credibility 
5.30 (1.26) 5.61 (1.21) 5.71 (1.13) 5.16 (1.40) 
Source F P 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy .232 .631 
Perceived Fit 3.43 .065 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy x Perceived Fit 4.74 .031 
Perceived Severity of a Crisis 18.24 .000 
Consumer-Company Identification 42.85 .000 
Notes: ANCOVA = analysis of covariance. 
R
2 
= .263 (Adjusted R
2
 = .244) 
 
Figure 3: Crisis Communication Strategies x Perceived Fit between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type on Perceived Corporate Credibility 
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Attitudes toward the Company 
 
Hypotheses 3d and 4d postulated about how type of crisis communication strategy 
and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type might interact to affect 
attitudes toward the company. The assumption test for equality of regression slopes 
revealed no significant interactions between type of a crisis communication strategy and 
the covariates: type of crisis communication strategy and perceived severity of a crisis, 
F(1, 188) = .121, p > .05, and type of a crisis communication strategy and consumer-
company identification, F(1, 188) = .757, p > .05. The test further confirmed no 
interaction effects between perceived fit and perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = 
2.59, p > .05, and between perceived fit and consumer-company identification, F(1, 188) 
= .150, p > .05.  
Since the assumption of equality of regression slopes was not violated, a two-way 
ANCOVA on attitudes toward the company was carried out. With covariates being 
perceived severity of a crisis (p < .01) and consumer-company identification (p < .001), 
as presented in Table 19, the results showed that type of crisis communication strategy 
and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type, F(1,191) = 3.40, p 
= .067, exhibited a marginally significant interaction effect on attitudes toward the 
company.  
However, the interaction pattern was not the same as those in the previously 
tested dependent variables – post-crisis corporate reputation and perceived corporate 
credibility. As shown in Figure 4, both of the excuse and apology strategies generated 
more favorable attitudes toward the company when the crisis (battery explosion) was 
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congruent with corporate associations (CA) than when the crisis (child labor practice) 
was incongruent with corporate associations (CA). To elaborate on this, when Apple, 
with its CA associations, was involved in the battery explosion crisis, the apology 
strategy produced more favorable attitudes toward the company than when it was 
involved in the child labor practices crisis. An additional contrast test also confirmed that, 
within the apology strategy conditions, the degree of congruence between corporate 
associations and crisis type were significantly affected, t(193) = 2.47, p < .05, thus  
supporting H3d. Similarly, the excuse strategy generated more favorable attitudes toward 
Apple in the battery explosion crisis than in the child labor practices crisis. This finding 
failed then to support H4d. However, in terms of the effectiveness of the excuse and 
apology strategies, the same pattern with the previous tests on feelings of betrayal, post-
crisis corporate reputation, and perceived corporate credibility was found. The apology 
strategy appeared to be more effective than the excuse strategy in the congruent condition; 
in the incongruent condition, the excuse strategy appeared to be more effective than the 
apology strategy.  
Like the previous hypotheses tests, the joint effect of the two factors on attitudes 
toward the company was still found, although both of the covariates had significant 
effects. In addition, while the main effect of type of crisis communication strategy was 
not significant (p > .05), a significant effect was found for perceived fit between 
corporate associations and crisis type, F(1,191) = 5.07, p < .05.  
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results on Attitudes toward the Company 
 Excuse Apology 
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Attitudes toward the 
Company 
5.45 (1.36) 5.63 (1.38) 5.87 (1.28) 5.20 (1.51) 
Source F P 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy .097 .756 
Perceived Fit 5.07 .025 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy x Perceived Fit 3.40 .067 
Perceived Severity of a Crisis 11.66 .001 
Consumer-Company Identification 64.61 .000 
Notes: ANCOVA = analysis of covariance. 
R
2 
= .263 (Adjusted R
2
 = .244) 
 
Figure 4: Crisis Communication Strategies x Perceived Fit between Corporate 
Associations and Crisis Type on Attitudes toward the Company 
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Negative Word-of-Mouth Intention 
Hypotheses 3e and 4e proposed an interaction effect on negative word-of-mouth 
intention through type of crisis communication strategy and perceived fit between 
corporate associations and crisis type. To test the hypotheses, a test for the assumption of 
equality of regression slopes was followed by a two-way ANCOVA on negative word-of-
mouth intention. Based on the assumption test, no significant interactions were found 
between the covariates and the independent variables: type of a crisis communication 
strategy and perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = .268, p > .05, type of a crisis 
communication strategy and consumer-company identification, F(1, 188) = .165, p > .05, 
perceived fit and perceived severity of a crisis, F(1, 188) = .047, p > .05, and perceived 
fit and consumer-company identification, F(1, 188) = 1.15, p > .05.  
While controlling for the perceived severity of a crisis (p < .01) and consumer-
company identification (p < .001), the results showed that, regarding negative word-of-
mouth intention, there was no significant interaction between type of crisis 
communication strategy and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type 
(p < .05), thus disconfirming H3e and H4e (see Table 20). The results also revealed an 
absence of the main effects of type of crisis communication strategy and perceived fit 
between corporate associations and crisis type.  
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results on Negative Word-of-Mouth 
Intention 
 
Excuse Apology 
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Negative Word-of-Mouth 
Intention 
3.08 (1.16) 2.89 (1.36) 2.97 (1.33) 3.21 (1.07) 
Source F P 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy .070 .791 
Perceived Fit 1.06 .306 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy x Perceived Fit .657 .418 
Perceived Severity of a Crisis 10.48 .001 
Consumer-Company Identification 46.94 .000 
Notes: ANCOVA = analysis of covariance. 
R
2 
= .236 (Adjusted R
2
 = .216) 
 
Purchase Intention 
The final two-way ANCOVA was conducted to test whether the effects of type of 
crisis communication strategy on purchase intention varied by perceived fit between 
corporate associations and crisis type. As presented in Table 21, the results showed no 
interaction effect between the two factors (p > .05), thus disconfirming H3f and H4f. The 
interaction effect did not significantly appear in the ANCOVA, yet the pattern of the 
interaction effect was consistent, interestingly, with those on the other dependent 
variables: post-crisis corporate reputation, perceived corporate credibility, and attitudes 
toward the company. This suggests that, when a crisis is congruent with corporate 
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associations, an apology strategy is more effective than an excuse strategy. And when a 
crisis is incongruent with corporate associations, an excuse strategy is more effective than 
an apology strategy. In addition, the absence of the main effects can be found in the table 
below. The summary of hypotheses tests is presented in Table 22. 
Table 21: Descriptive Statistics and ANCOVA Results on Purchase Intention 
 
Excuse Apology 
 Congruent Incongruent Congruent Incongruent 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Purchase Intention 5.35 (1.45) 5.72 (1.60) 5.73 (1.44) 5.30 (1.65) 
Source F P 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy .106 .745 
Perceived Fit 1.20 .275 
Type of a Crisis Communication Strategy x Perceived Fit 2.10 .149 
Perceived Severity of a Crisis 13.76 .000 
Consumer-Company Identification 76.11 .000 
Notes: ANCOVA = analysis of covariance. 
R
2 
= .329 (Adjusted R
2
 = .311) 
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Table 22: Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
 
 Hypotheses Results 
H3a 
Feelings of Betrayal 
Apology: Congruent < Incongruent Marginally Supported 
H4a Excuse: Congruent > Incongruent Not Supported 
H3b Post-Crisis Corporate 
Reputation 
Apology: Congruent > Incongruent Supported 
H4b Excuse: Congruent < Incongruent Not Supported 
H3c Perceived Corporate 
Credibility 
Apology: Congruent > Incongruent Supported 
H4c Excuse: Congruent < Incongruent Not Supported 
H3d Attitudes toward the 
Company 
Apology: Congruent > Incongruent Supported 
H4d Excuse: Congruent < Incongruent Not Supported 
H3e Negative Word-of-Mouth 
Intention 
Apology: Congruent < Incongruent Not Supported 
H4e Excuse: Congruent > Incongruent Not Supported 
H3f 
Purchase Intention 
Apology: Congruent > Incongruent Not Supported 
H4f Excuse: Congruent < Incongruent Not Supported 
 
DISCUSSION 
The effectiveness of crisis communication strategies can be affected in various 
ways from a variety of sources. Because of this fact, researchers must investigate 
interaction effects. The present paper, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is one of the 
first studies to directly examine the interaction between the effects of type of a crisis 
communication strategy and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type. 
The results reveal that, under certain conditions in a crisis situation, an apology strategy 
generates higher perceptions of corporate reputation and corporate credibility. The 
condition for this is namely that a corporate crisis is relevant to corporate key 
associations (e.g., a battery explosion where Apple possesses CA). If the corporate crisis 
is irrelevant to corporate key associations (e.g., child labor practices), an excuse strategy 
leads to more positive outcomes.  
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The results support, as hypothesized by the author, the interaction between type of 
crisis communication strategy and perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis 
type on post-crisis corporate reputation and perceived corporate credibility. Moreover, 
what makes an effective crisis communication strategy differ—in terms of influencing 
feelings of betrayal and attitudes toward the company as well as post-crisis corporate 
reputation and perceived corporate credibility— depending on the corporate associations-
crisis type congruence. In other words, while for congruent conditions, an apology 
strategy is more effective than an excuse strategy, for incongruent conditions, an excuse 
strategy is rather more effective than an apology strategy.  
To explain such interaction effects, attention should be given to the impact of 
perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type on feelings of betrayal. 
Hypothesis 2 was proposed based on the concept of betrayed feelings derived from the 
interpersonal communication and the organizational behavior literature (Morrison & 
Robinson, 1997; Elangovan & Shapiro, 1998). Considering this, the finding that 
corporate associations-crisis type congruence evokes more feelings of betrayal seems to 
highlight the role of feelings of betrayal in the effectiveness of crisis communication 
strategies.  
Consumers feel more betrayed when a company is involved in a crisis that 
violates that company’s key corporate associations (e.g., when a company held with CA 
associations faces a product defect, or when a company held with CSR associations faces 
unethical conduct). Such feelings of betrayal may compel the company to adopt a more 
accommodative response strategy. The results additionally prove that a crisis that touches 
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on a company’s core corporate associations can be more fatal by inducing consumers’ 
feelings of disappointment and betrayal, necessitating the adoption of a more 
accommodative crisis response.   
An even more interesting finding is how effective an excuse strategy can be when 
a company faces a crisis not relevant to its corporate associations. One possible 
explanation is the motivation of information process. As the motivation of information 
process differs by the level of consumer-company identification (Bhattacharya & Sen, 
2003; Einwiller et al., 2006), it may also differ depending on the degree of corporate 
associations-crisis type congruence. Specifically, when a company is involved in a crisis 
that violates its key corporate associations, consumers are likely to process such 
information in a more negatively biased manner. Their perceptions/attitudes, thus, would 
likely be more swayed by the negative corporate information. Consequently, a more 
accommodative strategy (a sincere apology and taking full responsibility) would be more 
effective.  
On the other hand, when the crisis is not relevant to key corporate associations, 
the information processing should be free of negative emotions. Consumers may be, 
therefore, motivated to process the negative corporate information in an objective and 
unbiased manner. Here, an apology strategy may only exacerbate things; a company 
seeking forgiveness may leave the impression that the crisis should be attributed to the 
company. An excuse strategy, however, may be viewed as simply a reasonable 
explanation of what happened. 
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It has so far been shown then that such elements as feelings of betrayal, post-crisis 
corporate reputation, perceived corporate credibility, and attitudes toward the company 
are all affected by the perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type. Where 
the study failed to show any such significant effects were on behavior-related responses: 
negative word-of-mouth intention and purchase intention. Despite Apple’s putative 
involvement in a negative event, consumers appeared to still be willing to buy Apple 
products. These unexpected results suggest that consumers’ behavior-related responses 
seem to be determined by such factors as company characteristics (e.g., corporate 
reputation, etc.) or consumer characteristics (e.g., brand ownership, brand loyalty, etc.). 
Hence, it is possible that the non-significant effects were because this study employed 
Apple, considered one of the most reputable and credible corporations in the U.S. 
Apple’s long-standing corporate reputation in the market of electronic devices and 
consumer’s brand loyalty toward the company may be an obstacle to behavior change.  
The results also exhibited the significant effects of the covariate of consumer-
company identification on post-crisis corporate reputation, perceived corporate 
credibility, attitudes toward the company, negative word-of-mouth intention and purchase 
intention. Consistent with Study 1, this finding further confirms that consumer-company 
identification is an important indicator of consumer perceptions and attitudes in a 
corporate crisis, which accordingly affects purchase intention.  
Finally, this study disconfirmed its own underlying assumption, that is, the more 
accommodative strategy such as an apology strategy is the more effective. Study 1 
suggested that the absence of an effect of type of crisis communication strategy resulted 
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from the crisis type – the accident crisis. Because of this, Study 2 employed a 
transgression crisis as a fabricated corporate event. Nevertheless, no effect from type of 
crisis communication strategy was found in Study 2. This undermines the explanation 
proposed in Study 1. The absence of a main effect from type of crisis communication 
strategy should not be attributed to crisis type (accident vs. transgression).  
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CHAPTER VI:  IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Today, all corporations could potentially be forced to confront a variety of crises. 
If a company is perceived as an important social institution, consumers will expect it to 
be socially responsible. Furthermore, with advances in interactive technology, negative 
corporate information can spread in a minute thus the impact of a corporate crisis may be 
tremendous, causing severe financial and reputational setbacks. Given a corporate 
environment vulnerable to any kind of a crisis and its impact on a long-earned corporate 
reputation, a prompt yet appropriate response to a crisis is the elusive but most sought 
after action. 
Focusing on the effectiveness of crisis communication strategies, this study 
attempted to extend our theoretical knowledge of the role of situational factors in 
selecting a crisis communication strategy when a company is involved in a negative 
incident. More than a few scholars (Dawar & Pillutla, 2000; Kim, 2002; Coombs, 2007a, 
2007b; Coombs & Holladay, 2009; Claeys, Cauberghe, & Vyncke, 2010; Dutta & Pullig, 
2011; Claeys & Cauberghe, 2011) have given their attention to the link between crisis 
communication strategies and crisis situations. These scholars have found potential 
situational factors to help select appropriate crisis communication strategies. 
Out of a variety of situational factors affecting the effects of corporate response 
strategies, the primary interest of the present study lies in relationships among situational 
components – a company, a crisis, and a consumer. More specifically, the study 
investigates the effects of the relationships between a company and a consumer (i.e., 
consumer-company identification) and between a company and a crisis (i.e., perceived fit 
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between corporate associations and crisis type) on the effect of type of crisis 
communication strategy. In exploring this research question, the premise of the study is 
as follows: 1) the relationships among situational components serve as other situational 
factors to affect consumer responses in a crisis; 2) the effectiveness of crisis 
communication strategies differ from another, 3) the more accommodative crisis strategy 
(e.g., apology) is the more effective.  
Based on such basic assumptions, the study focused on the effectiveness of less 
accommodative crisis strategies (e.g., an excuse strategy). The choice of a crisis 
communication strategy may seem straightforward—an apology strategy is generally the 
best crisis strategy (Bradford & Garrett, 1995; Coombs, 1996; Dean 2004; Lyon & 
Cameron, 2004, Huang 2006). For the company, however, this way of thinking is not 
only false but impractical. In some crisis situations, the apology strategy may backfire by 
demanding immense crisis management costs and instilling the impression that a crisis is 
completely attributable to the company. With the bottom line in mind, a company would 
thus be willing to take the most effective strategy. Hence, the examination of the effect of 
less accommodative strategies is of prime interest to most profit organizations. This study 
centered on the moderating roles of situational factors. In particular, it looked at how the 
effectiveness of crisis communication strategies is influenced by consumer-company 
identification and by congruence between corporate associations-crisis type. Theoretical 
and practical implications, limitations, and directions of future research are discussed 
below.  
Theoretical Implications 
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The study sheds light on the motivated reasoning theory in a corporate crisis 
context and makes theoretical contributions to the literature pertaining to negative 
information processing. According to the research findings, regardless the type of crisis 
communication strategy, consumer-company identification influences the effectiveness of 
crisis communication strategies. All the types of crisis communication strategies are more 
effective for consumers strongly identified with a company. The study puts more 
importance, however, on a less accommodative crisis communication strategy, the excuse 
strategy.  
The finding that the excuse strategy is more effective for consumers with strong 
identification supports the motivated reasoning theory that the manner of information 
process is determined by information recipient’s motivation (Kunda, 1990). It is assumed, 
based on the results, that consumer-company identification influences recipient’s 
motivation of information process. Given negative corporate information, consumers 
with strong identification with a company are motivated to reach a desired conclusion. 
Their defensive information process thus eventually reduces the perceived severity of the 
crisis and further minimizes corporate blame of the crisis.  
On the other hand, the information process adopted by consumers weakly 
identified with the company is likely to be more objective and unbiased. The information 
process by such consumers may produce a perception that the crisis more severe and an 
attribution of responsibility to the company. This implies that given a corporate crisis 
situation, a crisis communication strategy may be interpreted differently by the level of 
110 
consumer’s identification with the company. Hence, a specific crisis strategy effective for 
one group of people could fail with another group.  
Interestingly, in Study 1, the motivated reasoning theory supported the notion that 
consumer-company identification leads consumers to process negative corporate 
information in a positively biased manner. In Study 2, the theory also provided a rationale 
for the effect of perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type on 
consumer’s motivation of information process. Given a negative corporate event that 
violates a company’s core corporate associations, consumers may be motivated to process 
the information in a more negatively biased manner. Such speculations require more 
research that focuses on the information process in a corporate crisis context. In fact, a 
large body of corporate crisis communication research has focused on effective corporate 
response strategies from a public relations perspective. However, this study indicates the 
consumer-psychological approach to this issue is also necessary to enrich the literature 
and better understand consumer behavior in a crisis.  
The present study contributes to not only the stream of context-oriented crisis 
communication research but also the body of research on corporate identification and 
associations. In addition to moderating factors identified in past research (e.g., crisis type; 
Dutta & Pullig, 2011, the severity of crisis; Kim, 2002, the timing of crisis disclosure; 
Claeys & Cauberghe, 2011, a person’s locus of control; Claeys, Cauberghe, & Vyncke, 
2010, consumers’ prior expectations; Dawar & Pillutla, 2000, etc.), the study proves the 
moderating effect of perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type on the 
effectiveness of different types of crisis communication strategies. This finding also 
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indicates corporate associations, which have been found effective in forming consumers’ 
perceptions of companies in the context of marketing, should be considered as an 
important construct in selecting a corporate crisis response strategy. 
Practical Implications    
It is of prime interest for corporate crisis managers to select, when necessary, an 
effective crisis communication strategy. Considering today’s business environment where 
a company is continually at risk of being involved in some kind of a negative event, how 
to best choose the most appropriate and effective response strategy is a critical issue to 
marketers and corporate communicators. This study shows no difference manifested 
among the crisis communication strategies (excuse, compensation, apology). It should 
not be concluded, however, that any response strategy is equally effective in a crisis that 
can use any strategy.  
Such a simple interpretation of the findings would, in reality, be ineffective. 
Indeed, all of the internal and external factors surrounding the crisis will simultaneously 
figure into consumer responses and their crisis-related actions. Under such complex 
conditions, one possible suggestion is to segment and target crisis communication. The 
selection of a corporate response strategy may be dependent on the nature of group of 
people involved in the crisis. If a crisis that deals with the public, not specifically current 
customers of the company, then a more accommodative strategy (a sincere apology and 
seeking forgiveness) may be more effective and necessary to minimize the negative 
outcomes. On the other hand, if a negative event happened to a certain group of people 
favorable to the company (e.g., membership customers, loyal customers), the company 
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may consider employing something less accommodating than the apology (e.g., financial 
aids) to reduce customer complaints. Or they may consider a defensive strategy (e.g., 
excuse, justification) to justify what happened. This implies that as marketing strategies 
are devised to market segmentation, a company can devise crisis response strategies 
depending on target audiences’ characteristics. This segmentation and targeting of crisis 
communication can bring to a company the benefits of cost-effective crisis 
communication.   
In addition, the findings point to the importance of consistent corporate 
associations/image management in non-crisis/routine situations as well as additional 
criteria to consider in selecting the best response strategy. While long and hard-earned 
corporate associations/images work for the positive in routine and non-crisis situations, 
they can backfire when the company is involved in a crisis that calls into question the 
veracity of such associations. In such cases, the crisis can be perceived as a violation of 
consumer expectation established by the corporate associations/image so as to require a 
more accommodative response strategy such as the apology strategy. This case not only 
carries with it a financial burden but also decimates long-made marketing efforts for 
establishing the corporate associations/image. Companies should strive to monitor 
preventive crisis management, especially, not to be involved in a crisis that violates with 
their corporate missions and values. Additionally, the study helps provide crisis 
managers/communicators with cost-effective crisis communication efforts depending 
upon perceived fit between corporate associations and crisis type. The study does not 
suggest that a certain crisis response strategy should be used in a certain crisis context. 
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Instead, it suggests that a more accommodative response strategy such as full crisis 
responsibility (e.g., apology strategy) is not always the best solution. From the 
perspective of cost-effective crisis communication, a less accommodative response 
strategy should be strategically employed in accordance to crisis situations/contexts.  
Limitations and Future Research 
As with any research study, the present research has its limitations. The study 
used real companies to enhance external validity. One of its main interests was consumer-
company identification. Hence, using real companies in the experiments was thought to 
be more reasonable and valid. Using real companies in the experimental design, however, 
may have threatened internal validity. Subjects’ pre-existing attitudes and knowledge 
may have influenced their responses. For a corporate crisis, on the other hand, the study 
used fabricated crises. Future research should consider employing, for better consistency 
between internal and external validity, both real companies and real crises. In addition, 
the experiments were conducted in a laboratory setting. One time exposure to the 
newspaper article about a corporate crisis under time limits is totally different from being 
exposed to a great deal of news information about the corporate incident in reality. Such a 
controlled setting somewhat affects the external validity of the study. A more realistic 
setting in which consumers respond to a corporate crisis might produce different results. 
Also, the sample of this study was college students, but future research could extend the 
findings with a more representative sample. 
Another promising avenue for future research is to delve into the interaction 
between type of crisis communication strategy and perceived fit between corporate 
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associations and crisis type in different settings. If the moderating effect of corporate 
associations-crisis type congruence on the effect of type of a crisis communication 
strategy were also found with a company possessing CSR associations, it would further 
validate this study’s finding on the interaction. A more thorough examination of this issue 
warrants future research. 
As discussed above, it would also be interesting to examine the relationship 
between consumer-company identification and feelings of betrayal. The present study 
failed to show the positive effect of consumer-company identification on the reduction of 
betrayed feelings. Thus, it would be valuable to look at if consumer-company 
identification is rather negatively related to feelings of betrayal in the corporate crisis 
context. Given a negative corporate incident, loyal consumers may rather hold strong 
feelings of betrayal and such betrayed feelings may lead to negative consumer behavior 
such as retaliation (Gregoire & Fisher, 2008). Investigating the “love turns to hate” effect 
would provide deeper insights into understanding consumer-company relationships, 
especially in a crisis situation.   
The non-significant effect of identification on feelings of betrayal, in particular, 
leads to additional future research. In addition to examining the relationship between 
consumer-company identification and feelings of betrayal, other possible variables that 
relate to consumer’s emotion of betrayal can be explored. For example, personal 
involvement in a crisis, a type of crisis, as confirmed in Study 2, a cognitive link between 
corporate associations and a crisis, and so forth can be added to the study to better 
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capture the relationship between consumer-company identification and feelings of 
betrayal.  
In the research realm of consumer-company identification, future research can be 
further expanded to other brand-related concepts such as brand commitment, brand 
ownership, and brand loyalty. While consumer-company identification is one of the 
specific constructs that address consumer-company relationships, it may be highly related 
to other brand-related concepts. Today’s corporations are strategically communicating as 
corporate brands to enhance brand assets by symbolizing the organizations and to 
facilitate the penetration of the global market. That is, a company positions itself as an 
overarching brand of its family of products. Apple, for instance, represents iPhone, iMac, 
iPad, iPod, and so forth. Nevertheless, corporate communication studies from a 
marketing perspective are still scant. Dealing with a company as more of a corporate 
brand, rather than an organization, will offer marketing significance theoretically and 
practically.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Image Restoration Strategies (Benoit 1997) 
Strategy Key Characteristics 
Denial  
Simple Denial Did not perform act 
Shift the Blame Act performed by another 
Evasion of Responsibility  
Provocation Responded to act of another 
Defeasibility Lack of information or ability 
Accident Act was a mishap 
Good Intentions Meant well in act 
Reducing Offensiveness of Event  
Bolstering Stress good traits 
Minimization Act not serious 
Differentiation Act less offensive 
Transcendence More important considerations 
Attack Accuser Reduce credibility of accuser 
Compensation Reimburse victim 
Corrective Action Plan to solve or prevent problem 
Mortification Apologize for act 
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Appendix B: SCCT Crisis Response Strategies (Coombs 2007a) 
 
Primary crisis response strategies 
    Deny crisis response strategies 
Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is 
                wrong with the organization. 
Denial: Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis. 
Scapegoat: Crisis manager blamers some person or group outside of the organization for 
          the crisis.  
    Diminish crisis response strategies 
Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do 
       harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis. 
Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.  
    Rebuild crisis response strategies 
Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims. 
Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis 
        and asks stakeholders for forgiveness. 
 
Secondary crisis response strategies 
    Bolstering crisis response strategies 
        Reminder: Tell stakeholders about the past good works if the organization. 
        Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past 
                   good works by the organization. 
        Victimage: Crisis managers remind stakeholders that the organization is a 
                  victim of the crisis too. 
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Appendix C: Identification with a Company Measurement 
(Einwiller et al. 1985) 
 
Please indicate what you think of each of the following statements by clicking the button 
that best represents your opinion. (“7” means “strongly agree” and “1” means “strongly 
disagree”) 
 
I am somewhat associated with the company. 
I have a sense of connection with the company. 
I consider myself as belonging to the group of people who are in favor of the company. 
Customers of the company are probably similar to me. 
Employees of the company are probably similar to me. 
The company shares my values. 
Being a customer of the company is part of my sense of who I am. 
Purchasing the company’s product would help me express my identity. 
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Appendix D: Perceptions of Crisis Communication Strategies Measurement 
(Coombs & Holladay 2008) 
 
Please indicate what you think of each of the following statements by clicking the button 
that best represents your opinion. (“7” means “strongly agree” and “1” means “strongly 
disagree”) 
 
Study 1 
The company minimized their responsibility by claiming they were unable to control the 
incident. 
The company offered money or other ways of compensation to the victims. 
The company took full responsibility for the incident and asked for forgiveness. 
 
Study 2 
Apple minimized their responsibility by claiming they were unable to control the 
incident. 
Apple took full responsibility for the incident and asked for forgiveness. 
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Appendix E: Feelings of Betrayal Measurement 
(Gregoire & Fisher, 2008) 
Please indicate what you think of each of the following statements by clicking the button 
that best represents your opinion. (“7” means “strongly agree” and “1” means “strongly 
disagree”) 
 
After being aware of the incident described in the news article above, I felt cheated by the 
company. 
After being aware of the incident described in the news article above, I felt betrayed by 
the company. 
After being aware of the incident described in the news article above, I felt lied to by the 
company. 
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Appendix F: Post-Crisis Corporate Reputation Measurement 
(Coombs & Holladay 2002; Coombs & Holladay 2008) 
Please indicate what you think of each of the following statements by clicking the button 
that best represents your opinion. (“7” means “strongly agree” and “1” means “strongly 
disagree”) 
 
The company is concerned with the well-being of its publics. 
The company is basically dishonest. 
I do not trust the company to tell the truth about the incident. 
Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the company says. 
The company is not concerned with the well-being of its publics. 
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Appendix G: Perceived Corporate Credibility Measurement 
(Lafferty & Goldsmith, 1999; MacKenzie & Lutz, 1989) 
Please indicate your overall perception of the company by clicking the button that best 
represents your opinion. 
 
unbelievable __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : believable 
not credible __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : credible 
not trustworthy __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : trustworthy 
not dependable __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : dependable 
unreliable __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : reliable 
unreputable __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : reputable 
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Appendix H: Attitude toward the Company Measurement 
(MacKenzie& Lutz 1989; Till & Busler 2000) 
Please indicate your overall perception of the company by clicking the button that best 
represents your opinion. 
 
 bad __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : good 
 unfavorable __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : favorable 
 unpleasant __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : pleasant 
 dislike __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : like 
 negative __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : positive 
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Appendix I: Negative Word-of-Mouth Intention Measurement 
(Coombs & Holladay 2008) 
Please indicate what you think of each of the following statements by clicking the button 
that best represents your opinion. (“7” means “strongly agree” and “1” means “strongly 
disagree”) 
 
I would encourage friends or relative not to buy products from the company. 
I would say negative things about the company and its products to other people. 
I would recommend the company’s products to someone who asked my advice. 
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Appendix J: Purchase Intention Measurement 
(Till & Busler 2000) 
How likely is it that you would consider purchasing a product by the company? 
 
 
unlikely __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : likely 
definitely would not __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : definitely would 
improbable __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : probable 
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Appendix K: Perceived fit between Corporate Associations and Crisis Type 
Measurement 
 
Now, we would like you to take a few minutes to think about the corporate imag
e associated with Apple and the incident described in the news story you just rea
d. In particular, we would like to see what you think of each of the statements r
egarding the relevance of the incident you just read from the news story to Apple
’s expertise to produce and deliver its products and services.  
 
Product Explosion Condition 
 
I think that the issue of product defects in general (like the product explosion incident 
described in the news story) is related to Apple’s expertise in producing and delivering its 
products and services. 
 
I think that the issue of product defects in general (like the product explosion incident 
described in the news story) is relevant to Apple’s expertise in producing and delivering 
its products and services. 
 
I think that the issue of product defects in general (like the product explosion incident 
described in the news story) tells something about Apple’s expertise in producing and 
delivering its products and services. 
 
Child Labor Practices Condition 
 
I think that the issue of child labor in general (like the child labor practices described in 
the news story) is related to Apple’s expertise in producing and delivering its products 
and services. 
 
I think that the issue of child labor in general (like the child labor practices described in 
the news story) is relevant to Apple’s expertise in producing and delivering its products 
and services. 
 
I think that the issue of child labor in general (like the child labor practices described in 
the news story) tells something about Apple’s expertise in producing and delivering its 
products and services. 
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Appendix L: Corporate Associations (CA and CSR) Measurement 
(Berns, Riel, & Bruggen, 2005) 
 
Please indicate what you think of each of the following statements by circling the number 
that best represents your opinion. (“7” means “strongly agree” and “1” means “strongly 
disagree”) 
 
Corporate Ability 
I think Apple develops innovative products and services. 
I think that Apple offers high-quality products. 
I think that Apple offers products that are good value for the price. 
I think that Apple is well managed. 
I think that Apple employs talented people in comparison with its competitors. 
 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
I think that Apple supports good causes. 
I think that Apple behaves responsibly regarding the environment. 
I think that Apple is highly involved in the local community.  
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Appendix M: Perceived Severity of Crisis Measurement 
(Gregoire & Fisher, 2008) 
 
Please indicate what you think of each of the following statements about the incid
ent described in the news article you just read by clicking the button that best re
presents your opinion. 
 
I think that the incident caused consumers: 
minor problems __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : major problems 
small inconveniences __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : big conveniences 
minor aggravation __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : major aggravation 
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Appendix N: News Article Believability Measurement 
 
Please indicate what you think of the news article above by clicking the button that best 
represents your opinion. 
 
not at all believable __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : completely believable 
not at all plausible __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : completely plausible 
doesn’t make sense at all __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : __ : completely makes sense 
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Appendix O: Newspaper Article for Study 1 
 
Excuse Strategy 
Associated Press – April 13, 2012 – It has been reported that Dell was involved in 
polluting the Sierra Mac River. The source of the pollution turned out to be the spilling of 
a chemical known as phenol. According to a Dell spokesperson, a few days before the 
accident, one of the Dell plants located in the Sierra Mac River was found to have a 
malfunctioning pipeline linking the phenol storage tank to the production line. Dell 
replaced the pipeline. In spite of this measure, the preparatory pipeline ruptured and 10 
tons of phenol poured into the Sierra Mac River, flowing near the plant. Following an 
investigation of the incident, inspectors found that a torrential downpour from the week 
before led to the rupturing of the preparatory pipeline.  
At a press conference held early Thursday morning, Dell officials asserted that all 
appropriate measures had been taken to avoid any accident involving the malfunctioning 
pipeline. Claiming to be a victim of forces beyond its control, Dell declared the event 
could have happened to any company.  
 
Compensation Strategy  
Associated Press – April 13, 2012 – It has been reported that Dell was involved in 
polluting the Sierra Mac River. The source of the pollution turned out to be the spilling of 
a chemical known as phenol. According to a Dell spokesperson, a few days before the 
accident, one of the Dell plants located in the Sierra Mac River was found to have a 
malfunctioning pipeline linking the phenol storage tank to the production line. Dell 
replaced the pipeline. In spite of this measure, the preparatory pipeline ruptured and 10 
tons of phenol poured into the Sierra Mac River, flowing near the plant. Following an 
investigation of the incident, inspectors found that a torrential downpour from the week 
before led to the rupturing of the preparatory pipeline.  
At a press conference held early Thursday morning, Dell officials pledged to invest 
$200,000 dollars to restore the river. They also pledged that, as compensation for any 
inconvenience caused, they would give $100 to each household affected by a water 
outage due to the accident.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
Apology Strategy  
Associated Press – April 13, 2012 – It has been reported that Dell was involved in 
polluting the Sierra Mac River. The source of the pollution turned out to be the spilling of 
a chemical known as phenol. According to a Dell spokesperson, a few days before the 
accident, one of the Dell plants located in the Sierra Mac River was found to have a 
malfunctioning pipeline linking the phenol storage tank to the production line. Dell 
replaced the pipeline. In spite of this measure, the preparatory pipeline ruptured and 10 
tons of phenol poured into the Sierra Mac River, flowing near the plant. Following an 
investigation of the incident, inspectors found that a torrential downpour from the week 
before led to the rupturing of the preparatory pipeline.  
At a press conference held early Thursday morning, Dell officials accepted full 
responsibility for the incident. They said they hoped those affected by the incident could 
forgive them. They also promised to do their best to restore the river and that they would 
set up a 24-hour call center that people could call to get information about the incident. 
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Appendix P: Newspaper Article for Study 2 
 
Excuse Strategy + Congruent 
CNN Worldwide Report – April 20, 2012 – It has been reported that in Portland, 
Oregon, an Apple iPad 2 caught fire while being used by its owner. The cause is now 
being linked to the device’s lithium ion battery overheating. The fire occurred while the 
owner was lying in bed watching a movie. According to the owner, he had fallen asleep 
and woke to his bed on fire. In the fire, no one was killed, though the owner was injured 
and there was extensive fire damage to the house. 
At a press conference held early Thursday morning, Apple officials vigorously denied the 
alleged link to a defective battery. The company claimed that all the appropriate measures 
had been taken. They also asserted that Apple technicians had examined the battery and 
found it not to be defective. Apple claimed that another cause might be found for the fire 
and urged fire officials to investigate the premises again. The company also urged its 
customers to follow the basic precaution of not leaving the iPad running all night on a 
flammable surface like a bed sheet. They also declared that the product was safe and the 
incident resulted from the consumer’s inattentive use, thus a recall will not be considered 
now and for the future. 
 
Excuse Strategy + Incongruent 
CNN Worldwide Report – April 13, 2012 – Apple admitted that their suppliers in China 
had been caught using child labor. Last week, a Shanghai newspaper broke the news of 
child labor practices in unsafe conditions at Apple plants in China. Chinese police are 
currently looking into allegations of exploitation of underage workers at the plants 
operated by Apple suppliers. 
At a press conference held early Thursday morning, Apple officials strongly asserted that 
they had done due diligence in ensuring that no underage workers were employed at their 
factories in China. In reality, however, Apple conceded that it is impossible to exercise 
complete control over what happens at these factories. They also said that as long as the 
desire for family income and for cheap labor trumps respect for children’s rights, this 
deplorable, though entrenched, practice would be likely to continue. 
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Apology Strategy + Congruent 
CNN Worldwide Report – April 13, 2012 – It has been reported that in Portland, 
Oregon, an Apple iPad 2 caught fire while being used by its owner. The cause is now 
being linked to the device’s lithium ion battery overheating. The fire occurred while the 
owner was lying in bed watching a movie. According to the owner, he had fallen asleep 
and woke to his bed on fire. In the fire, no one was killed, though the owner was injured 
and there was extensive fire damage to the house. 
At a press conference held early Thursday morning, Apple officials accepted full 
responsibility for the incident. They hoped that the consumer’s family could forgive them. 
Apple officials pledged to compensate the family and immediately recall 5000 iPads 
falling within a range of specific serial numbers. Apple said that these iPads are the only 
ones using that type of battery and they would replace these batteries free of charge. 
 
 
Apology Strategy + Incongruent 
CNN Worldwide Report – April 13, 2012 – Apple admitted that their suppliers in China 
had been caught using child labor. Last week, a Shanghai newspaper broke the news of 
child labor practices in unsafe conditions at Apple plants in China. Chinese police are 
currently looking into allegations of exploitation of underage workers at the plants 
operated by Apple suppliers. 
At a press conference early Thursday morning, Apple officials accepted full 
responsibility for the child labor practices carried out by their suppliers in China. 
Officials said they hoped that consumers could forgive the company for allowing such a 
breach of labor practices to occur. They said that they would make every effort to 
eradicate the deplorable practice of hiring children. They pledged to strengthen 
workplace supervision by sending out more managers from headquarters to monitor labor 
practices. 
 
 
 
 
134 
References 
Aaker, J., Fournier, S., & Brasel, S. A. (2004). When good brands do bad. Journal of 
 Consumer Research, 31, 1-16. 
 
Ahearne, M., Bhattacharya, C. B., & Gruen, T.(2005). Antecedents and consequences of 
 customer-company identification: Expanding the role of relationship marketing. 
 Journal of Applied Psychology, 90(3), 574-585. 
 
Ahluwalia, R. (2002). Examination of psychological processes underlying resistance to 
 persuasion. Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 217-232. 
 
Ahluwalia, R., Burnkrant, Robert E., & Unnava, H. Rao (2000). Consumer Response to 
 Negative Publicity: The Moderating Role of Commitment. Journal of
 Marketing Research, 37, 203-214. 
 
Bagozzi, R. P., Tybout, A. M., Craig, C. S., & Sternthal, B. (1979). The construct validity 
 of the tripartite classiŽ  cation of attitudes. Journal of Marketing Research, 16, 
 88–95. 
 
Benoit, W. L. (1995). Accounts, excuses, and apologies: A theory of image restoration 
 strategies, New York: State University of New York Press. 
 
Benoit, W. L. (1997). Image repair discourse and crisis communication. Public Relations 
 Review, 23(2), 177-186. 
 
Benoit, W. L., & Brinson, S. L. (1994). AT&T: Apologies are not enough. 
 Communication Quarterly, 42(1), 75-88. 
 
Benoit, W. L., & Czerwinski, A. (1997). A critical analysis of USAir’s image repair 
 discourse. Business Communication Quarterly, 60(3), 38-57. 
 
Benoit, W. L., & Drew, S.(1997). Appropriateness and effectiveness of image repair 
 strategies. Communication Reports, 10, 153-163. 
 
Benoit, W. L., & Lindsey, J. J. (1987). Argument strategies: antidote to Tylenol’s 
 poisoned Image. Journal of the American Forensic Association, 23, 136-146. 
 
Berens, G., van Riel C. B. M., van Bruggen, G. H. (2005). Corporate associations and 
 consumer product responses: The moderating role of corporate brand dominance, 
 Journal of Marketing, 69(3), 35-48. 
135 
Bhattacharya, B. C., & Sen, S. (2003). Consumer-company identification: A framework 
 for understanding consumers’ relationships with companies. Journal of 
 Marketing, 67(2), 76-88. 
 
Bick, G., Jacobson, M. C., & Abratt, R. (2003). The corporate identity management 
 process revisited. Journal of Marketing Management, 19(7/8), 835-855.  
 
 
Brinson, S. L., & Benoit, W. L. (1999). The tarnished star: Restoring Texaco’s damaged 
 public image. Management Communication Quarterly, 12(4), 483-510. 
 
Bradford, J. L., & Garret, D. E. (1995). The effectiveness of corporate communicative 
 responses to accusations of unethical behavior. Journal of Business Ethics, 
 14(11), 875-892. 
 
Brown, T. J., & Dacin, P. A. (1997). The company and the product: Corporate 
 associations and consumer product responses. Journal of Marketing, 61(1), 68-84. 
 
Cho, S. H., & Gower, K. K. (2006). Framing effect on the public’s response to crisis: 
 Human interest frame and crisis type influencing responsibility and blame. Public 
 Relations Review, 32(4), 420-422. 
 
Claeys, A. S., & Cauberghe, V. (2011). Crisis response and crisis timing strategies, two 
 sides of the same coin. Public Relations Review, doi: 
 10.1016/j.pubrev.2011.09.001 
 
Claeys, A. S., Cauberghe, V., & Vyncke, P. (2010). Restoring reputations in times of 
 crisis: An experimental study of the Situational Crisis Communication Theory and 
 the moderating effects of locus of control. Public Relations Review, 36, 256-262. 
 
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading activation theory of semantic 
 processing. Psychological Review, 82, 407-428. 
 
Coombs, W. T. (1996). Communication and attributions in a crisis: An experimental 
 study in crisis communication. Journal of Public Relations Research, 8(4), 279-
 295. 
 
Coombs, W. T. (1998). An analytic framework for crisis situations: Better responses from 
 a better understanding of the situation. Journal of Public Relations Research, 
 10(3), 177-191. 
 
Coombs, W. T. (1999). On going crisis management. Thousands Oak, CA: Sage. 
 
136 
Coombs, W. T. (2004). West pharmaceutical’s explosion: Structuring crisis discourse 
 knowledge. Public Relations Review, 30(4), 467-473. 
 
Coombs, W. T. (2006). The protective powers of crisis response strategies: Managing 
 reputational assets during a crisis. Journal of Promotion Management, 12, 241-
 259. 
 
Coombs, W. T. (2007a). Protecting organization reputations during a crisis: The 
 development and application of situational crisis communication theory. 
 Corporate Reputation Review, 10(3), 163-176. 
 
Coombs, W. T. (2007b). Attribution theory as a guide for post-crisis. Communication 
 Research, 33, 135-139. 
 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2001). An extended examination of the crisis 
 situation: A fusion of the relational management and symbolic approaches. 
 Journal of Public Relations Research, 13, 321-340. 
 
Coombs W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2002). Helping crisis managers protect reputational 
 assets: Initial tests of the situational crisis communication theory. Management 
 Communication Quarterly, 16, 165-186. 
 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J.(2008). Comparing apology to equivalent crisis 
 response strategies: Clarifying apology’s role and value in crisis communication. 
 Public Relations Review, 34, 252-257. 
 
Coombs W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2009). Further explorations of post-crisis 
 communication: Effects of media and response strategies on perceptions and 
 intentions. Public Relations Review, 35, 1-6. 
 
Cowden, K., & Sellnow, T. L. (2002).Issues advertising as crisis communication: 
 Northwest airlines’ use of image restoration strategies during the 1998 pilot’s 
 strike. Journal of Business Communication, 39(2), 193-219. 
 
Dacin, P. A., & Brown, T. J. (2002). Corporate identity and corporate associations: A 
 framework for future research. Corporate Reputation Review, 5(2/3), 254-263. 
 
Dardis, F., & Haigh M. M. (2009). Prescribing versus describing: testing image 
 restoration strategies in a crisis situation. Corporate Communications: An 
 International Journal, 14(1), 101-118. 
 
137 
David, P., Kline, S., & Dai, Y. (2005). Corporate social responsibility practices, corporate 
 identity, and purchase intention: A dual-process model. Journal of Public 
 Relations Research, 17, 291–313 
 
Dawar, N., & Pillutla, M. M. (2000). Impact of product-harm crises on brand equity: The 
 moderating role of consumer expectations. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(2), 
 215-226. 
 
Dean, D. H. (2004).Consumer reaction to negative publicity. Journal of Business  
 Communication, 41(2), 192-211. 
 
Dionisopoulos, G., & Vibbert, S. L. (1988). CBS vs. Mobil Oil: Charges of creative 
 bookkeeping in 1979. In H. R. Ryan (Ed.), Oratorical encounters (pp. 241-251). 
 New York: Greenwood. 
 
Dutta, S. & Pullig, C. (2011). Effectiveness of corporate responses to brand crises: The 
 role of crisis type and response strategies, Journal of Business Research,  
 doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.01.013 
 
Eagly, A.H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. FortWorth, TX: Harcourt 
 Brace Jovanovich. 
 
Einwiller, S. A., Fedorikhin, A., Johnson, A. R., & Kamins, M. A. (2006). Enough is 
 enough! When identification no longer prevents negative corporate associations. 
 Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 34(2), 185-194. 
 
Elangovan, A. R., & Shapiro, D. L. (1998). Betrayal of trust in organizations. Academy of 
 Management Review, 23(3), 547-566. 
 
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of fractured parading. Journal of 
 Communication, 43, 51-58. 
 
Feldman, J. M., & Lynch, J. (1988). Self-generated validity and other effects of 
 measurement on belief, attitude, intention and behavior. Journal of Applied 
 Psychology 73(3), 421-435. 
 
Finkel, E. J., Rusbult, C. E., Hannon, P. A., Kumashiro, M., & Childs, N. M. (2002). 
 Dealing with betrayal in close relationships: Does commitment promote 
 forgiveness? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 956-974. 
 
Fuchs-Burnett, T. (2002).Mass public corporate apology. Dispute Resolution Journal, 
 57(3), 26-32. 
 
138 
Garrett, D. E., Bradford, J. L., Meyers, R. A., & Becker, J. (1989). Issue management and 
organizational accounts: An analysis of corporate responses to accusations of 
unethical business practice. Journal of Business Ethics, 8, 507-520. 
 
Gregoire, Y., & Fisher, R. J. (2008). Customer betrayal and retaliation: When your best 
 customers become your worst enemies. Journal of Academic Marketing Science, 
 36, 247-261. 
 
Harris, M. B., & Miller, K. C. (2000). Gender and perceptions of danger. Sex Roles, 
 43(11/12), 843-863. 
 
He, H., & Mukherjee, A. (2009). Corporate identity and consumer marketing: A process 
 model and research agenda. Journal of Marketing Communications, 15(1), 1-16. 
 
Hermann, C. F. (1972). International crises: Insights from behavioral research, The Free 
Press, New York. 
 
Herr, P. M., Kardes, F. R., & Kim, J. J. (1991). Effects of word-of-mouth and product 
 attribute information on persuasion: An accessibility diagnosticity perspective. 
 Journal of Consume Research, 14(4), 353-362. 
 
Hibbard, J. D., Brunel, F. F., Dant, R. P., & Iacobucci, D. (2001). Does relationship 
 marketing age well? Business Strategy Review, 12 (Winter), 29-35. 
 
Hofstede, G. (1997). Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. New York: 
 McGraw Hill. 
 
Huang, Y. (2006). Crisis situations, communication strategies, and media coverage. 
Communication Research, 33(3), 180-205. 
 
Huang, Y. (2008). Trust and relational commitment in corporate crises: The effects of 
 crisis communicative strategy and form of crisis response. Journal of Public 
 Relations Research, 20, 297-327. 
 
Huber, F., Vogel, J., & Meyer, F. (2009).When brands get branded. Marketing Theory, 9 
 (1) 
 
Johnson, A. R. (2005). When a celebrity is tied to immoral behavior: Consumer reactions 
 to Michael Jackson and Kobe Bryant. Advances in Consumer Research, 32, 100-
 101. 
 
Kelly, H. H. (1973). The process of causal attribution. American Psychology, 28, 107-
 128. 
139 
Kim, Y. (2002). Understanding crisis management. Seoul: Chaek and Gil. 
 
Kim, H. J, & Cameron, G. T. (2011). Emotions matter in crisis? The role of anger and 
sadness in the publics’ response to crisis news framing and corporate crisis 
response. Communication Research, 38(6), 826-855. 
 
Kim, S., & Choi, S. M. (2012).The effects of crisis type and evaluative tone of news 
 coverage on consumer response toward post-crisis corporate advertising, paper 
 presented in American Academy of Advertising Conference, Myrtle Beach, SC, 
 March 15-18. 
 
Kim, J., Kim, H. J., & Cameron, G. T. (2008). Are your corporate crisis responses 
 effective?: The effects of crisis types and corporate responses on the public’s 
 perceptions of Organizational responsibility for crisis. Proceedings, Coral Gables, 
 FL: International Public Relations Research Conference, 348-363.  
 
Klein, J., & Dawar, N. (2004). Corporate social responsibility and consumers’ 
 attributions and brand evaluations in a product-harm crisis. International Journal 
 of Research in Marketing, 21, 203-217. 
 
Klein, J. G., Smith, N. C., & John, A. (2004).Why we boycott: consumer motivations for 
 boycott participation, Journal of Marketing, 68(3), 92–108. 
 
Kline, S., Simunich, B., & Weber, H. (2009). The use of equivocal messages in 
 responding to corporate challenges. Journal of Applied Communication Research, 
 37(1), 40-58. 
 
Koehler, J. J., & Gershoff, A. D. (2003). Betrayal aversion: When agents of protection 
 become agents of harm. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
 Processes, 90, 244-261. 
 
Kramer, R. M. (1991). Intergroup relations and organizational dilemmas: The role of 
 categorization processes. Research in Organizational behavior, 13, 191-207. 
 
Kunda, Z, (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108(3), 480-
 498. 
 
Laczniak, R. N., DeCarlo, T. E., & Ramaswami, S. N. (2001).Consumers’ response to 
 negative word-of-mouth communication: An attribution theory perspective. 
 Journal of Consumer Psychology, 11(1), 57-73. 
 
140 
Laufer, D., & Coombs, W. T. (2006).How should a company respond to a product harm 
 crisis? The role of corporate reputation and consumer-based cues. Business 
 Horizons, 49, 379-385. 
 
Laufer, D., & Gillespie, K. (2004).Differences in consumer attributions of blame between 
 men and women: The role of perceived vulnerability and empathic concern. 
 Psychology and Marketing, 21(2), 209-222. 
 
Laufer, D., Gillespie, K., McBride, B., & Gonzalez, S. (2005). The role of severity in 
  consumer attributions of blame: Defensive attributions in product harm crises in 
 Mexico. Journal of International Consumer Marketing, 17(2/3), 33-50. 
 
Lerbinger, O. (1997). The crisis manager: Facing risk and responsibility. Mahwah, NJ: 
 Lawrence Erlbaum Associations. 
 
Lyon, L., & Cameron, G. T. (2004). A relational approach examining the interplay of 
 prior reputation and immediate response to a crisis. Journal of Public Relations 
 Research,16(3), 213-241. 
 
MacKenzie, S. B., & Lutz, R. J. (1989).An empirical examination of the structural 
 antecedents of attitude-toward-the-ad in an advertising pretesting context. Journal 
 of Marketing, 53(2), 48-65. 
 
Madrigal, R. (2000). The role of corporate associations in new product evaluation. 
 Advances in Consumer Research, 27, 80-86. 
 
Masssey Karrenmans, J. C., & Aarts, H. (2007). The role of automaticity in forgiving 
 close others. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 902-917. 
 
McCullough, M. E., Pargament, K. I., & Thoresen, C. E. (2000). The psychology of 
 forgiveness: History, conceptual issues, and overview.In M. McCullough, K.  
 
Pargament, & C. Thoresen (Eds.), Forgiving: Theory, research and practice (pp. 1-14). 
 New York: Guilford. 
 
McCullough, M. E., Rachal, K. C., Sandage, S. J., Worthington, E. L. Jr., Wade Brown, 
 S., & Hight, T. L. (1998). Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships: II. 
 Theoretical elaboration and measurement. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 75, 1586-1603. 
 
Mitroff, I. I., Pauchant, C. T., & Shrivastava, P. (1998). The structure of man-made 
 organizational crises: Conceptual and empirical issues in the development of a 
141 
 general theory of crisis management. Technological Forecasting and Social 
 Change, 33, 83-107. 
 
Morrison, E. W., & Robinson, S. (1997). When employees feel betrayed: A model of 
 how psychological contract violation develops. Academy of Management Review, 
 22, 226-256. 
 
Mowen, J. C. (1979). Further information consumer perceptions of product recalls. In 
 Advances Consumer Research, (ed. Olson, J.). San Francisco, CA. 
 
Mowen, J. C., Jolly, D. W., & Nickell, G. S. (1981). Factors influencing consumer 
 responses to product recalls: A regression analysis approach. In Advances 
 Consumer Research, (ed. Moore, K.), pp. 405-470. Arlington, VA. 
 
Pashupati, K., Arpan, L., & Nikolaev, A. (2002). Corporate advertising as inoculation 
 against negative news: An experimental investigation of efficacy and presentation 
 order effects. Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising, 24(2), 1-15. 
 
Pearson, C. M., & Clair. J. A. (1998). Reframing crisis management. Academy of 
 Management Review, 23(1), 59-76. 
 
Price, L. L., & Bardhi, F. (2001). After commercial betrayal. Paper presented at the 
 Association for Consumer Research, 11-14 October 2001, Austin, Texas. 
 
Ritchie, B. W. (2004). Chaos, crises and disasters: A strategic approach to crisis 
 management in The tourism industry. Tourism Management, 25, 669-683. 
 
Robbennolt, J. K. (2000). Outcome severity and judgments of responsibility: A meta-
 analytic review. Journal of Applied Psychology, 30 (12), 2575-2609. 
 
Romeo, J. B. (1991). The effect of negative information on the evaluations of brand 
 extensions and the family. Advances in Consumer Research, 18, 399-406. 
 
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Protecting the self: Impression management in predicaments. 
 Impression Management: The self-concept, social identity & interpersonal 
 relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 124-165. 
 
Seeger, M. W., Sellnow, T. L., & Ulmer, R. R. (1998).Communication, organization and 
 crisis. In Communication yearbook, (ed. Roloff, M. E.). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
 Sage. 
 
Siomkos, G. J., & Kurzbard, G.(1994).The hidden crisis in product-harm crisis 
 management. European Journal of Marketing, 28(2), 30-41. 
142 
Spears, Nancy, & Singh, Surendra N. (2004). Measuring Attitude toward the Brand and 
 Purchase Intentions. Journal of Current Issues and Research in Advertising, 26 
 (2), 53-66. 
 
Taylor, M. (2000). Cultural variance as a challenge to global public relations: A case 
 study of the Coca-Cola scare in Europe. Public Relations Review, 26(3), 277-293. 
 
Till, Brian D., & Busler, M. (2000). The Match-Up Hypothesis: Physical Attraction, 
 Expertise, and the Role of Fit on Brand Attitude, Purchase Intent, and Brand 
 Beliefs. Journal of Advertising, 29(3), 1-13. 
 
Um, N. H. (2011).Consumers’ response to negative information about a celebrity 
 endorser. Ph.D. Dissertation. University of Texas at Austin. 
 
Van Heerde,H. J., Helsen, K., & Dekimpe, M. G. (2007).The impact of a product harm 
 crisis on marketing effectiveness. Marketing Science, 26(2), 230–245. 
 
Weiner, B. (1986). An attributional theory of motivation and emotion. New York: 
 Springer Verlag. 
 
Zhang, J., Qiu, Q, & Cameron, G. T. (2004). A contingency approach to the Sino- US 
 conflict resolution. Public Relations Review, 30, 391-399. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
